‘Puritan Moderation: The Pursuit of Self-Mastery’

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Introduction
Richard Baxter remarks, ‘It is a very hard thing for us to write or preach to one party, but the other will misapply it to themselves, and make an ill use of it’. Here, Baxter is speaking of ‘over-scrupulous’ people, who misapply his teaching on moderation. Because of their misapplication, they succumb to an austere existence—‘afraid of every bit they eat, or of all they possess, or wear, or use, and sometimes of their very children and relations’. Such misapplication is not peculiar to Baxter. The Puritans as a whole are victims of it, accounting in large part for the common perception of the dour Puritan.

The purpose of this article is to clarify Puritan teaching on moderation in order to free it from such misinterpretation and misapplication. By consequence, it is hoped this will provide some fresh insight into our own thinking on the subject.

1. The Basis of Puritan Moderation
The starting-point for this discussion is Augustine’s view of the affections. He identifies four motions of the soul: desire, fear, joy, and sorrow. Desire and joy are the ‘volition of consent’ to a ‘loved’ object: desire occurs when consent takes the form of seeking the object, and joy occurs when consent takes the form of enjoying it. On the other hand, fear and sorrow are the ‘volition of aversion’ from a ‘hated’ object: fear occurs when aversion takes the form of turning from the object, and sorrow occurs when aversion takes the form of experiencing it.

In this paradigm, love and hatred ultimately determine the response of the other affections: desire is yearning for what is loved; joy is delighting in what is loved; fear is fleeing from what is hated; and sorrow is experiencing what is hated. From this, Augustine argues that as long as the object of an individual’s love is ‘well-directed’, the affections are good. This changes, of course, if the object of an individual’s love is ‘ill-directed’. Prior to Adam’s fall, the object of humanity’s love was God and, as a result, the affections were ‘good’. This
condition, however, was terminated at the time of the fall when love for God was lost and, consequently, the affections became ‘evil’. At regeneration, the individual’s love is again ‘well-directed’ and the affections respond accordingly. Augustine summarizes—‘The citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right.’

The Puritans adopt Augustine’s paradigm. According to Edward Reynolds—the affections are those natural, perfective, and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are ... ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodnesse beareth a natural conveniencie or vertue of satisfaction, unto them; or by an antipathie and aversation from those, which bearing a contrarietie to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures.

This means that the affections are the inclination or disinclination of the soul to an object in accordance with the soul’s perception of that object as either desirous or odious. With this basic definition, Reynolds identifies five pairs of affections. The first—love and hatred—concerns the attitude of the soul to an object in its own essential nature. If the object is good, then the soul loves it; but, if the object is evil, then the soul hates it. Reynolds affirms that these ‘are the two radicall, fundamentall, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest’. The second pair—desire and scorn—is the response of the soul to an object from which it is absent. If the object is good, then the soul desires it; but, if the object is evil, then the soul scorns it. The third pair is joy and sorrow. When the soul is in contact with the object, it either rejoices or grieves depending on whether the object is deemed good or evil. The fourth pair is despair and hope. The former is stirred when it is impossible to obtain a desired object whereas the latter is stirred when it is possible. The fifth pair is boldness and fear. The former occurs when avoidance of a scorned object is probable whereas the latter occurs when avoidance is improbable.

Like Augustine, the Puritans affirm that these affections are good (i. e. sanctified) when the soul’s love is ‘well-directed’. It is this paradigm that provides the foundation for their teaching on moderation.
2. The Nature of Puritan Moderation

For the Puritans, moderation is simply the subjection of ‘ill-directed’ affections. This conviction is evident in their teaching on filial and servile fear.¹⁰ These differ in two respects. First, they differ in their object. According to William Gouge, filial fear ‘ariseth from faith in the mercy and goodness of God’. When the soul feels ‘a sweet taste of God’s goodnesse’ and finds ‘that in his favour only all happinesse consisteth, it is stricken with such an inward awe and reverence.’¹¹ On the other hand, servile fear ‘ariseth from diffidence: For when mans heart doubteth of Gods mercy, and expecteth nothing but vengeance, the very thought of God striketh an awe or rather dread into him.’¹²

Second, they differ in their effect. For Gouge, ‘A sonne feareth simply to offend or displease his father: so as it is accompanied with love. A bondslave feareth nothing but the punishment of his offence; so as it is joined with hatred.’¹³ For this reason, filial fear ‘maketh us more respect what God requireth and commandeth, than what our corrupt heart desireth and suggesteth: It subdueth our unruly passions, and bringeth them within compasse of dutie: It maketh us deny our selves and our owne desires’.¹⁴ For the Puritans, such subjection of ‘unruly passions’ is the essence of moderation.

Many students of Puritanism miss this emphasis. Daniel Doriani, for example, maintains that the Puritan view of moderation ‘conformed to prevailing ideas’,¹⁵ received from Aristotle through Aquinas, namely—

1. self-control with regard to the senses and sensual pleasures
2. modesty or dignity in conduct, so that one does not show extreme emotion, enthusiasm or devotion to anything
3. the general avoidance of passion¹⁶

Doriani agrees with the first idea, but views the other two as unbiblical. He appeals to numerous Scriptures that commend zeal.

In addition, he rejects the idea of moderation as an ‘absolute value’¹⁷ stating ‘it may be good, bad, or indifferent, depending on the object of the passion, the manner of its expression, and the nature of the situation in which the passion might be expressed’.¹⁸ Doriani believes the Puritans succumb to a distorted view of moderation, owing to their failure ‘to distinguish the two
senses of lust: (1) strong desire, as a neutral thing depending on its object; and
(2) inordinate passion, especially for something forbidden’.19

There are two problems with Doriani’s thesis. First, in making ‘zeal’ and
‘passion’ synonymous terms,20 he infuses a meaning into ‘passion’ that is
foreign to the Puritans. They are not opposed to zeal. Thomas Wilson defines
zeal as ‘the earnestness and increase of all the affections, liking or disliking, as
love and hatred, grief and joy, desires, delights, fears, and anger, boiled to the
highest degree, and to the hottest temper and intention’.21 For Baxter, ‘Zeal is
the fervour or earnestness of the soul: its first subject is the will and affections,
excited by the judgment; and thence it appears in the practice. It is not a
distinct grace or affection, but the vigor and liveliness of every grace, and their
fervent operations’.22 The Puritans view zeal as a necessary requirement to the
true worship of God.

Second, in suggesting the Puritans embrace moderation as an ‘absolute value’,
Doriani misses the significance of Puritan affective theology. William Perkins
defines moderation as a ‘vertue, that moderateth appetite or lust’.23 This virtue
arises when the soul’s ‘affection’ is ‘tempered and allayed with the feare of
God’.24 He adds—

Some learned Philosophers … taught, that the very nature of Vertue standeth
in a meane, or mediocritie of affections. This that they say is true in part, but
not wholly. For the mediocritie, of which they speak, without renovation of
affections, is nothing: and therefore all virtues, that are not joined with a
renovation and change of the affections, are no better than sinnes.25

Perkins is speaking of the Stoics,26 who believe everyone possesses impulses—
inclinations toward or away from objects. As long as reason is in control, these
impulses are not an issue. However, when they exceed the bounds of reason,
they become passions: fear, sorrow, pleasure, and desire. The external factors
that cause these passions are without virtue; thus, the passions themselves are
irrational. Virtue then is a state of moderation attained when people become
indifferent toward externals, thereby freeing themselves from passions.

Augustine criticises the Stoics for believing ‘the fool can do no more than
desire, rejoice, fear, be sad’27 adding, ‘If that is to be called apathy, where the
mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices?’ Again, ‘If some...have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquility. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible’. The Puritans concur with Augustine. They do not view moderation as an absolute value in the tradition of Stoicism. Gouge states—

The doatage of Stoicks who would have all natural affection rooted out of man, is contrary to this pattern, and unworthy to finde any entertainment among Christians: for what doe they aime at, but to root that out of man, which God hath planted in him, and to take away the means which God hath used for the better preservation of man? That wise man whom they frame to themselves is worse then a brute beast: he is a very stocke and blocke.

Like Augustine, the Puritans have no difficulty with ‘strong’ affections as long as they are ‘well-directed’. Moderation, therefore, occurs when the soul loves God.

3. The Practice of Puritan Moderation

Baxter defines love ‘as the complacency of the appetite in apprehended good’. According to the Puritans, there are two appetites: sensitive and rational. Therefore, sensitive love is the ‘complacency of the sensitive appetite’ in whatever the senses deem good, whereas rational love is the ‘complacency of the rational appetite’ in whatever reason deems good. Baxter adds to this, defining self-love as the ‘love of happiness’. Therefore, sensitive self-love is the love of life, whereas rational self-love is the love of God. For the Puritans, this paradigm unlocks humanity’s three-fold state.

(1) In innocence, the soul is directed by a ‘true’ self-love. It loves happiness. With its rational appetite, it views God as the greatest good. It loves God and, therefore, its affections are ‘well-directed’. In this state, the soul’s sensitive appetite follows the lead of its rational appetite, meaning its love for the creature is moderated by its love for God.

(2) In apostasy, the soul is directed by a ‘false’ self-love. It still loves happiness. However, it no longer views God as the greatest good. It no longer
loves God and, therefore, its affections are ‘ill-directed’. In this state, the soul’s sensitive appetite no longer follows the lead of its rational appetite, meaning its love for the creature is no longer moderated by its love for God. As a matter of fact, the rational appetite has fallen under the control of the sensitive appetite. According to Baxter, ‘The thing therefore that every carnal man would have, is an everlasting, perfect, sensual pleasure; and he apprehendeth the state of his soul’s perfection mostly as consisting in this kind of felicity.’

(3) In renewal, ‘true’ self-love is restored—at least, in part. This means the affections are caught between the sensitive and rational appetites. In this state, the individual’s goal is to gain the mastery over the sensitive appetite.

This impetus lay behind the practice of Puritan moderation. Because many overlook this, the erroneous notion of Puritan asceticism has arisen. Jesus says to his disciples, ‘If anyone wishes to come after Me, he must deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Me’. Here, two aspects of discipleship are delineated: denying self and following Jesus. If asceticism is a synonym for such discipleship, then the Puritans are certainly ascetics. However, the term asceticism is often used to describe the ‘purification of the soul from its passions’ as ‘a necessary means for loving God more perfectly and for attaining to contemplation’. This ‘purification of the soul’ is achieved by ‘external exercises’ such as ‘abstinences, fasts, and vigils’ which serve to dull the senses.

This system of thought stems from a dualistic view of the universe, in which the material (including the body) is evil and the spiritual is good. It is for this reason that abstinence from certain natural actions is viewed as a necessary step to a deeper spirituality. In describing the Puritans as ascetics, Max Weber states, ‘Asceticism turns all its force ... against one thing in particular: the uninhibited enjoyment of life and of the pleasures it has to offer.’

Whilst it is true the Puritans hold to a bi-partite view of humanity in which the soul is superior to the body, it is false to suggest that they regard the body as inherently evil. For this reason, the concept of ‘Puritan asceticism’ lacks substance. Undoubtedly, misplaced enthusiasm led some to adopt ascetic practices.

However, this should not be seen as normative. As Neil Keeble rightly notes, ‘The main thrust of Puritan thought was that the way to perfection lay not through abstinence and asceticism, but through the right admission
and moderate utilization of the world and the flesh. The Puritan neither under-valued nor over-valued them: he sanctified them’.48

Richard Lovelace arrives at a similar conclusion.

It is clear that the Puritans were extremely worried about this sort of amalgam and that they took pains to emphasize the fact that the biblical sarx did not mean the body but the totality of sin affecting the personality; that progress in holiness and approach to God were effected by mortification of sin and not of the senses.49

This view is clearly evident in George Swinnock, who writes, ‘Godliness does not deny us our natural delights, only rectify and regulate them, lest we should surfeit them.’50 He entertains no thought of abstaining from ‘natural delights’ in order to mortify the senses in an attempt to purify the soul. On the contrary, he writes—

The merciful God is pleased, out of his bounty, not only to allow his creatures what is for necessity, but also what is for delight. Christian, it is more than God requireth of thee to be always pondering and poring on such subjects as make thy heart sad, whereby thou thyself art disadvantaged, banishing that cheerfulness from thee, which is an ornament to Christianity; and others discouraged, supposing that all who walk in heaven’s way, must needs be, as thou art, mopeish and melancholy. Piety doth regulate, but not extirpate our pleasures.51

Swinnock’s assertion that God has given us ‘not only...what is for necessity, but also what is for delight’ is extremely significant. In a similar vein, Perkins comments—

We may use these gifts of God...not sparingly alone, and for meere necessitie, to the satisfying of our hunger, and quenching of our thirst; but also freely and liberally, for Christian delight and pleasure. For this is that liberty, which God hath granted to all beleevers.52

Clearly, the Puritans have no problem in deriving pleasure from the created order. To demonstrate this, Swinnock appeals to 1 Timothy 4:4, where the
apostle Paul declares, ‘For everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with gratitude.’ God created all things, and declared all things to be good. This fact undermines the notion that the physical is inherently evil. Therefore, the way to holiness is not found in abstaining from God’s good gifts, but in carefully enjoying them. The regenerate must not over-value natural delights according to their sinful inclination; rather, they must moderate their use of them according to the fear of God. Swinnock says, ‘Godliness will cause thee to enjoy the creatures in God, the fountain of them, and thereby they will be pleasant to thee’. Baxter reveals the same mindset, affirming—

You know not what it is to be a man, if you know not that God hath made all the senses to be the inlets of objects, and so of holy pleasures into the soul... It is therefore a foolish pretence of spirituality, to dream of acting without our senses, or avoiding those delights, which may and must be sanctified to us.

Elsewhere, he states, ‘The delight of the flesh or senses is a natural good; and the natural desire of it in itself...is neither vice nor virtue: but when this little natural good is preferred before the greater spiritual, moral, or eternal good, this is the sin of carnal minds.’ Baxter rejects the idea that ‘all love of the creature’ is sin, for ‘the works of God are all good, as such; and all goodness is amiable’.

The problem arises when the creature turns the soul from God, resulting in ‘inordinate pleasure’. This can happen with ‘honour, greatness, authority, praises, money, houses, lands, cattle, meat, drink, sleep, apparel, sports, friends, relations, and life itself’. This danger in no way nullifies the legitimate use of these sensitive pleasures. Baxter states, ‘If it be such a love to the creature as exceedeth not its worth, and is intended ultimately for God, and maketh you not love him the less but the more, it is not it that I am speaking against, or persuading you to mortify’.

In short, Baxter’s concern is that God occupy first place: ‘When you delight in God, your creature delight will be sanctified to you, and warrantable in its proper place.’ Therefore, he says—
Let all lawful, natural mirth be taken in, as animated and sanctified by this holy delight and joy; and know that this natural, sanctified mirth is not only lawful, but a duty exceeding congruous and comely for a thankful believer in his way to everlasting joy.\(^{62}\)

Yet again—

So far as we can make use of a delight in friends, or food, or health, or habitations, or any accommodations of our bodies, to further our delight in God, or to remove those melancholy fears or sorrows, which would hinder this spiritual delight, it is not only lawful, but our duty to use them, with that moderation as tendeth to this end.\(^{63}\)

The issue is not food, drink, or any other delight. The Puritans have no qualms with such outward pleasures. They are good, because God ordained them. The issue is abuse, whereby the soul seeks its satisfaction in these things apart from God. The regenerate must moderate such inordinate desire. They do so by enjoying sensitive delights in an attitude of thanksgiving, according to God’s design. As Richard Schlatter observes, ‘The Puritan was determined to make earthly things divine, not by forbidding them, but by infusing them with holiness.’\(^{64}\)

Conclusion

Based on Titus 2:11-12, Swinnock remarks, ‘The body of godliness parteth itself into these three principal members:’ godliness—our duty towards God; soberness—our duty towards ourselves; and righteousness—our duty towards others.\(^{65}\) William Gurnall arrives at the same conclusion, stating that our duty toward God is ‘piety’, our duty toward ourselves is ‘sobriety’, and our duty toward others is ‘righteousness’.\(^{66}\) Commenting on the same text, Calvin points out that the apostle Paul—

limits all actions of life to three parts: soberness, righteousness, and godliness. Of these, soberness doubtless denotes chastity and temperance as well as a pure and frugal use of temporal goods, and patience in poverty. Now righteousness embraces all the duties of equity in order that to each one be rendered what is his own (Rom. 13:7). There follows godliness, which joins us in true holiness with God when we are separated
from the iniquities of the world. When these things are joined together by an inseparable bond, they bring about complete perfection.67

Interestingly, the term soberness is the Greek adverb σωφρονέω, and in Mark 5:15, the healed demoniac is described as being ‘in his right mind’ (σωφρονούντα). Thus, to be ‘sober’ is to be in one’s ‘right mind’. It is what William Hendriksen calls ‘self-mastery’—for the Puritans, the rational appetite exercising the ‘mastery’68 over the sensitive. Such sobriety means the affections are removed from sinful objects and moderated toward earthly objects, because they are sanctified by love for God.

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ENDNOTES
3. The terms affection and passion are used varyingly in the primary literature. (1) Passions are the emotions of the sensitive appetite, whereas the affections are the emotions of the rational appetite. (2) Affections and passions are the same, belonging to the sensitive appetite. (3) Affections and passions are the same, belonging to both the rational and sensitive appetites; hence, humans share some affections-passions with animals whilst others are unique to them. This is the predominant view among the Puritans.
10. By way of example, see Baxter, CD, I:125,187; Stephen Charnock, Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God (London: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1853;

16. Doriani, PSP, 140.
17. Doriani, PSP, 141.
18. Doriani, PSP, 141.
19. Doriani, PSP, 141.
20. Doriani, PSP, 140.
25. Perkins, CC, 163.
the difference between Calvin and Augustine. Like Augustine, Calvin seems to define immoderation in terms of ‘ill-directed’ affections.

29. Gouge, DD, 83. For Reynolds on Stoicism, see PF, 46-50.
30. George Swinnock provides an excellent example, writing, ‘According to the price we set upon things, such is our pleasure and joy in their presence, and our pain and sorrow in their absence’. This mention of the four passions is followed by an exhortation to prepare for adversity: “Love heaven as thy paradise, and look on earth but as the place of thy pilgrimage, then thou wilt cheerfully travel in all ways, whether fair or foul”. In all this, Swinnock never suggests that the four passions are irrational. He encourages the subjection of the passions to reason, because they are set upon the wrong object – earth. It is this misdirection that makes them excessive. If people love heaven as their paradise, there is no immoderation. GS (*The Works of George Swinnock*, ed. J. Nichol [London, 1868; rpt., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1992]) II:72-73.
37. Baxter maintains that there is no conflict between the pursuit of God’s glory (love for God) and the pursuit of one’s happiness (love for self). On the contrary, they are mutually dependent. He writes, ‘I cannot possibly do any thing for one, that doth not equally promote the other, if I do them rightly, preferring God before myself, in my inward estimation, love, and intention’. CD, I:158.
38. Charnock describes a three-fold self-love: ‘natural’—a desire to seek our good; ‘carnal’—a desire to be superior to God; and ‘gracious’—a desire to fulfil our end,

39. Baxter, CD, I:157. Also see I:64, 76, 93. For Gouge, see DD, 82-83.

40. Baxter, CD, I:161. Also see I:21, 229, 248, 284, 295.

41. Calvin was no ascetic, acknowledging his disapproval of ‘some good and holy men’, who only ‘allowed man to use physical goods in so far as necessity required’. *Institutes*, III:X:1. Whilst applauding their concern to curb ‘wantonness,’ he rejects their strictness, commenting, ‘To them necessity means to abstain from all things that they could do without’. *Institutes*, III:X:1. Calvin has no interest in such asceticism, stating, ‘Away, then, with that inhuman philosophy which, while conceding only a necessary use of creatures, not only malignantly deprives us of the lawful fruit of God’s beneficence but cannot be practiced unless it robs a man of all his senses and degrades him to a block’. *Institutes*, III:X:3. In contrast, Calvin gives only one ‘principle’ to guide people in their use of pleasures—‘that the use of God’s gifts is not wrongly directed when it is referred to that end to which the Author himself created and destined them for us, since he created them for our good, not for our ruin’. *Institutes*, III:X:2. This is the essence of moderation. He writes, ‘And we have never been forbidden to laugh, or to be filled, or to join new possessions to old or ancestral ones, or to delight in musical harmony, or to drink wine. True indeed. But where there is plenty, to wallow in delights, to gorge oneself, to intoxicate mind and heart with present pleasures and be always panting after new ones—such are very far removed from a lawful use of God’s gifts’. *Institutes*, III:XIX:9. For more on Calvin’s view, see Lucien Richard, *The Spirituality of John Calvin* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1974).

42. Mark 8:34.

43. This is how Calvin defines mortification: denying self and following Jesus (or bearing the cross). Self-denial is inward mortification, whereas following Jesus is outward mortification. Self-denial involves the subduing of passions whereas following Jesus involves the suffering of afflictions. *Institutes*, III:VII:1-10.


47. At times, it is possible to find ascetic practices in Baxter. To curb ‘filthy lusts’, he
recommends: ‘Eat no breakfasts nor suppers’; ‘Drink no wine or strong drink’; ‘Eat no hot spices’; ‘Let blood’; and ‘Oft bathe in cold water’. CD, I:335.


52. Perkins, CC, 321. Also see 342.


54. Swinnock, GS, I:262.


63. Baxter, CD, I:141. Also see I:112,124.


1. The Basis of Puritan Moderation

The starting-point for this discussion is Augustine’s view of the affections. He identifies four motions of the soul: desire, fear, joy, and sorrow. Desire and joy are the volition of consent to a ‘loved’ object: desire occurs when consent takes the form of seeking the object, and joy occurs when consent takes the. It is this paradigm that provides the foundation for their teaching on moderation. Puritan Moderation: The Pursuit of Self-Mastery

2. The Nature of Puritan Moderation

For the Puritans, moderation is simply the subjection of ill-directed affections. This conviction is evident in their teaching on filial and servile fear. These differ in two respects. First, they differ in their object. The pursuit of mastery—the constant desire to get better and better at something that matters to you—is one of the three forms of behavior that drives people to their highest productivity level. The other two are autonomy and purpose. Apparently this drives are innate to humans. We want to be better and master what we do. Mastery standing out as extremely skillful in a particular field is essential to make a difference in a world in which most routine tasks are automated or outsourced. Therefore, the odds of success are much higher in people who have a proactive mindset and the desire to come up with and implement their own solutions. You will be interesting to employers and clients only if you are able to solve complex problems.

Summary. Puritan self-government. In 1582, a bookbinder named Thomas Gibson painted disquieting graffiti in a church in Bury St Edmonds. Next to the royal arms, which Queen Elizabeth had erected in every parish church, Gibson wrote God’s condemnation of the Laodiceans from Revelation 3:15-16: ‘I know thy works, that thou are neither hot nor cold.’ This confrontation corresponds to our textbook understanding of puritanism: an almost Manichaean worldview in which the binary opposition of true religion and popery, the godly and the ungodly, left little room for moderation. Puritanism, in this view, was generated by the rejection of compromise—most famously the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559 and was committed to replacing lukewarm conformity with hot, zealous faith.