Theory and Exclusion: Gender, Masculinity, and International Political Economy
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In women's studies, a good piece of conventional wisdom holds that it is simply not enough to 'add women and stir'. In political science, women are just now being added, and the field has hardly begun to stir. -- Nannerl Keohane

Stop the whining and just get on with it. -- Susan Strange

Once one views international relations through the lens of sex and biology, it never again looks the same. It is very difficult to watch Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, or militias from Liberia and Sierra Leone to Georgia and Afghanistan divide themselves up into what seem like indistinguishable male-bonded groups in order to systematically slaughter one another, and not think of the chimps at Gombe. -- Francis Fukuyama

If masculine privilege is so all-pervasive and absolute, we must ask . . . why it is that men live substantially shorter lives than women, kill themselves at rates vastly higher than women, absorb close to 100 percent of the fatal casualties of society's productive labour, and direct the majority of their violence against 'their own' ranks.... They surely deserve more sustained, non-dogmatic attention than . . . every feminist theorist I have encountered grants them. -- Adam Jones

Several years ago, when a previous version of this chapter was written for the first edition of the volume at hand, it was appropriate to note that Nannerl Keohane's statement was perhaps even more true of the discipline of international relations (IR) than it was political science. In the years since the 'new women's movement' emerged in the late 1960s, progress had been made by at least some feminist academics in incorporating analyses of women and gender relations into traditional areas of academic study, but the same could not be said of a feminist international relations theory. Indeed, of the little work that had been done on women and international relations to that point, one shared observation was that IR, of all the social science disciplines, had been one of the most resistant to incorporating feminist analyses of women and gender relations.

My argument then focused on the extent to which, despite how much contemporary work within international political economy (IPE) converged with the kinds of questions feminists have raised, there was a disturbing silence on the part of IPE scholars when it came to questions of gender. Like mainstream IR before it, IPE had rarely acknowledged, much less analysed, how female subordinations are created and sustained both nationally and internationally. This absence is important because many IPE scholars have taken it as part of their project to explore the social and political complex as a whole rather than its separate parts. This is not merely an empirical claim, but a political one as well. As Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze note, many authors within the ‘new’ IPE ‘are more concerned with the involvement in the global because they are considered less powerful.’ By this view, I argued, the continued invisibility of women and gender within IPE could no longer be sustained.
Today, the terrain is in some ways dramatically different, and in other ways it remains very much the same. Most feminist contributions to IR and IPE, go far beyond the simple liberal notion of adding women into which Keohane referred, and it is certainly true that the field has finally begun to stir though, as the quotations above indicate, not always in ways we may have anticipated. On the one hand, there has been a virtual explosion of literature within the realms of gender and IR and of gender and IPE in both journals and monographs, with institutional acknowledgement in the form of a journal, *International Feminist Journal of Politics* as well as the continued success of the ‘feminist theory and gender studies’ section at the International Studies Association, which draws some of the largest audiences throughout that professional association’s annual meetings.

On the other hand, feminist interventions have elicited a range of responses from the rest of our field. Some have tried to interject attention to women or to gender, and while too often this remains a token and largely unintegrated effort, this is sometimes more of an effort than was previously visible. At the same time, however, others, such as Susan Strange in her call to feminists to ‘stop whining’ and Francis Fukuyama in his use of chimp behaviour to illustrate his agreement with ‘the feminist view’ that a world run by women would be less aggressive, competitive, and violent, have offered up baffling accounts of feminism that only serve to underline the extent to which this literature remains almost entirely unread and unheard by too many scholars within both IR and IPE.

Others seem to take more seriously the feminist IR literature—insofar as they actually read it—but see in that literature a threat to traditional sites of power and so reproduce the backlash we have witnessed over the past decade against a whole host of social justice issues, including affirmative action, human rights for gays and lesbians, anti-racist activism, pay equity, and, of course, feminism. In each, the form of the argument is the same, with ‘new’ issues consistently depicted as redirecting attention or resources away from more traditional concerns or groups. In IR we have seen this most recently in Adam Jones’s celebrated lament that feminist attention to women within IR has detracted attention away from the usually more important concerns facing men.

This chapter will attempt, first, to situate the emergence of the feminist IR literature within the field of IR and will note the ways in which many of the questions raised by feminists have paralleled those raised by international political economists. It will then argue, following recent work by Spike Peterson, that the contemporary structural crisis of capitalism and, in conjunction with that crisis, the feminist and critical analyses made of it constitute in part a crisis of masculinity. Seen in this light, Peterson argues, reactions of continued silence, as well as those seeking to reassert and reprivilege traditional understandings of naturalized forms of masculinism, are responses to the ‘deeply disturbing’ attempts to ‘disrupt’ what is understood to be natural. As Peterson writes:

> Gender is conventionally invisible because the *longue durée* of masculinism obscures the power required to institutionalise, internalize, and reproduce gender hierarchy and its associated oppressions. In this sense, gender is hard to see because it is so taken for granted. But gender also resists visibility and critique due to its pervasiveness and our personal investments: it is not only ‘out there’ structuring activities and institutions, and ‘in our heads’ structuring discourse and ideologies; it is also ‘in here’—in our hearts and bodies—structuring our intimate desires, our sexuality, our self-esteem and our dreams. As a consequence, our investments in
gendered selves fuel heroic and self-sacrificing as well as despotic and self-serving actions.\textsuperscript{14}

Gender, in short, informs all that we do. It is, therefore, imperative that we interrogate gender when we explore questions of IR and IPE.

\textbf{International Relations and Feminism}

One of the reasons that feminist issues have been raised only quite recently within the study of international relations has to do with the very different concerns of IR and feminism. International relations is a subfield of political science, and is much younger than its parent discipline. A product of the twentieth century, mainstream IR was born in the interwar period and located primarily in the United States.\textsuperscript{15} It was created in large part to serve the needs of government, specifically the American government, in training diplomatic and government personnel and answering the ‘What should we do?’ questions about important diplomatic and strategic issues of the time. More than most other social science disciplines, mainstream IR has had an intimate relationship with government, both through the funding of IR research institutes and in the regular exchange of academic and government personnel. As Stanley Hoffmann notes, ‘IR academics and researchers operate not merely in the corridors but also in the kitchens of power’.\textsuperscript{16}

Informed by this goal of serving government, scholars of mainstream international relations have taken as their central concerns the causes of war and the conditions of peace, order, and security.\textsuperscript{17} Such inquiry appears to be antithetical to the study of women. The ‘high politics’ of international security policy is, as J. Ann Tickner writes, ‘a man’s world, a world of power and conflict in which warfare is a privileged activity’ and from which women traditionally have been excluded.\textsuperscript{18}

Much of international relations theorizing, moreover, posits a separation between inside and outside, community and anarchy It is argued that while one may appropriately raise questions of ethics and politics when examining relations within civil society, such questions are irrelevant outside, in the society of nations, where it is appropriate to ask only how rational states may enhance their power within an anarchic system.\textsuperscript{19} Apparently absent from the particular substantive concerns of IR, in fact or by definition, the suggestion that women or gender relations should be examined in international relations is often met with, at best, incredulity or, at worst, hostility.

In contrast to the field of international relations, contemporary feminism has its roots in a social movement: the women’s liberation movement. It represents a protest against prevailing gender-based power structures and against accepted societal norms and values concerning women and men. Feminists have expressed this protest in a variety of ways, with some demanding that women be allowed to join the spheres in which only men, historically, have been permitted and others demanding more dramatic and fundamental social change. Whatever its different prescriptions, however, feminism is a politics of protest directed at transforming the historically unequal power relationships between women and men.\textsuperscript{20} As a politics of protest, feminism clearly follows a different path from that of IR. It is concerned with those ‘inside’ questions often defined as irrelevant to the study of international relations. That IR and feminism may be antithetical, then, does not follow merely from their apparently different substantive concerns, but more importantly from their normative and political redispositions: mainstream IR has been aimed primarily at maintaining the (international)
status quo while feminism aims at precisely the opposite. It is little wonder that studies of women and international relations do not proliferate.

**Feminism and IPE: Affinities?**

From the preceding sketch, it should be clear that many of the issues raised by feminists about IR have previously or are currently being raised by specialists in IPE. While the political motivations often are quite different, political economists share a dissatisfaction with mainstream IR’s emphasis on, among other things, questions of ‘high politics’, its lack of theorizing about the relationship between domestic and international politics, the inappropriate and usually untenable separation of ‘politics’ and ‘economics’, and the failure to assess co-operation and interdependence to the same degree that it has anarchy.\(^{21}\)

International political economists have approached their critique of IR in a variety of ways. Some have sought to enlarge the number of relevant actors through adding firms, international organizations, and sometimes even social movements to the usual consideration of state behaviour and consequences of state action. Others have focused instead on the addition of new issues, arguing that trade and monetary concerns are as important in their own right as military and strategic ones. Still others examine new forms of behaviour, whether examples of co-operation or the intersubjectively shared norms associated with regimes and rule-governed activities within international relations.\(^ {22}\)

More recently, some IPE work has moved well beyond simply ‘adding in’ actors and issues to a far more profound ontological and epistemological challenge to the discipline. As Stephen Gill observes, ‘we may be in the throes of an ontological change or shift: a redefinition of understandings and experiences that form basic components of lived reality. This includes mental frameworks—for example, the way that we think about social institutions and forms of political authority.’\(^ {23}\) Such an account suggests that critical and Gramscian IPE is beginning to address how, as Mark Laffey writes, ‘social subjects understand themselves and their relations to social structures, structures which are in turn constituted in and by social practices informed by intersubjective understandings.’\(^ {24}\) Not only does such a move create more ‘spaces’ for a discussion of women or gender within IR and IPE, but feminist approaches in all of their guises are centrally involved in a project that reveals both the complexities and deep-seatedness of some of our most fundamental and naturalized ‘mental frameworks’.\(^ {26}\)

**Feminists Examine IR**

Feminist analysts share with IPE scholars many of their epistemological strategies.\(^ {27}\) Like liberal political economists, for example, numerous feminists have sought to introduce women as a new actor or issue within IR and IPE. This work seeks to document the underrepresentation of women in traditional areas of international relations activities, or conversely, to show how women do participate in international relations. For example, much of the early work on women and development was written from this perspective and aimed at demonstrating how women were involved in the development process and the manner in which this involvement had been ignored previously by development researchers and practitioners. Ester Boserup’s pioneering book, *Woman’s Role in Economic Development*,\(^ {28}\) documented women’s economic contributions in the Third World, and from Boserup’s own and later work we now know that women constitute 60 to 80 per cent of the agricultural work-force in Africa and Asia and more than 40 per cent in Latin America.\(^ {29}\) Development
planners ignored these facts because they assumed that women in the developing world were involved primarily in household chores and tasks. As such, the policies that they produced tended to bypass women workers, fundamentally misunderstanding the economic processes they were supposedly analysing and thereby exacerbating women's inequality rather than alleviating it. By showing women's true role in developing societies, Boserup and her colleagues created the basis for Women in Development (WID) programs and departments in almost all major international development agencies. The WID agenda has been to take women into account in the formulation and implementation of development policies around the world.

While the collection of information about women's roles in development and other issue-areas of relevance to IPE is useful and important, a number of criticisms of this approach have emerged. These parallel the criticisms made of liberal political economy more generally and suggest that the collection of empirical information about women is made at the expense of any assessment of the structural features of relations of inequality between women and men. Implicit in a liberal analysis, the critics argue, is the assumption that the inclusion of women into areas previously denied them will eliminate gender inequalities. By contrast, feminists who attempt to introduce analyses of class or patriarchy argue that inequalities are a defining characteristic of the very structures in which women might participate, and as such their participation alone will not change this fundamental fact.

Theorists who have focused on patriarchy, described variously as standpoint theorists or radical feminists, suggest that the relations of inequality observed within both the study and practice of international relations reflect the simple fact that both of these represent the viewpoint of men over that of women. These feminists argue that women have a unique perspective, different from that of men, and that this perspective should be given a voice within many of the decisions associated with international relations. By this view, women tend to be more nurturing and pacifistic than men and thus should be brought into international relations not on equity grounds but to allow women’s more peaceful views some influence. Accordingly, a feminist reformulation of notions such as power, security, and national interest—in which, from a ‘feminine’ perspective, ‘power’ is defined as empowerment and ‘security’ as including development and ecological concerns—is an important first step towards a better understanding of women and international relations.

Other authors focused instead on the dynamic of class and gender oppression. They (and others) argue that analyses presuming a single ‘feminine’ perspective essentialize and universalize the category of ‘woman’ (and ‘man’) at the expense of other forms of domination. Analyses like those of Maria Mies or Gita Sen and Caren Grown have assessed the impact of the changing international division of labour on women and the ways in which women’s subordination is sustained under different historical modes of production, with forms of domination associated with class relations taking advantage of, and building on, pre-existing relations of domination between women and men. For example, with the introduction of private property during the colonial period, women tended to suffer more than men because they lost completely their access to traditional land-use rights. Likewise, as production shifts to the export sector during the forms of structural adjustment we are witnessing today, it is again women who are moving into these poorly paid positions with little or no opportunities to improve wages or benefits and the prospect of only short-term, limited employment. The point here, of course, is that class and gender oppression work together rather than separately.
These demonstrations of the way sex and class oppression are linked improve yet again on the previous analyses outlined above, but they, too, have been subject to criticism. Primarily, the concern is that analyses of gender must examine as well how racist ideologies and practices figure into these issues. Many feminists argue also that gender oppression is sustained as much by the ideas surrounding certain practices, the self-understandings reproduced through institutional as well as individual action, as by those practices themselves. Informed by these kinds of concerns, feminists from a variety of perspectives have sought to explore how gender—understood as the prevailing assumptions concerning women and men, their roles in family and society, even what it means to be a man or woman, masculine or feminine—affects and is affected by the practices of international relations. As Chandra Talpade Mohanty writes:

The idea I am interested in invoking here is not ‘the work that women do’ or even the occupations that we/they happen to be concentrated in, but rather the ideological construction of jobs and tasks in terms of notions of appropriate femininity, domesticity, (hetero)sexuality, and racial and cultural stereotypes.

Cynthia Enloe provides one of the most sustained accounts of the ways in which gender figures within IPE. She examines a whole series of issues, including tourism, foreign domestic servants, and export processing zones, and the manner in which particular ‘packages of expectations’ associated with masculine and feminine behaviour are used to sustain and legitimate certain practices within IR. She notes, for example, the manner in which developing countries are increasingly relying on tourism as a source of foreign exchange, and the profoundly gendered nature of the tourism industry. As Enloe writes: ‘On the oceans and in the skies: the international business travellers are men, the service workers are women.’ This includes not only flight attendants and chambermaids, but the burgeoning market for prostitutes within the sex tourism industry. Enloe’s project is not simply to recount the places in which women find themselves, however, but rather to provide some insight into 'how' this has happened. How particular material conditions join together with existing assumptions and ideas about women and men is made clear in the following passage:

To succeed, sex tourism requires Third World women to be economically desperate enough to enter prostitution; having done so it is made difficult to leave. The other side of the equation requires men from affluent societies to imagine certain women, usually women of colour, to be more available and submissive than the women in their own countries. Finally, the industry depends on an alliance between local governments in search of foreign currency and local and foreign business men willing to invest in sexualized travel.

Understood in this way, not only are the activities of women placed within the realm of international relations, but they are understood in specific ways because of the particular material conditions and ideas associated with their activities: in this case, women’s economic desperation is joined with the eroticization of racist stereotypes. The entire scenario works only if all of these factors are considered together and not separately.

Developing countries’ search for foreign exchange also leads Enloe to examine multinational corporations and export processing zones (EPZs). She outlines in detail the various practices used, first, to recruit young women into the assembly lines of EPZs, and then the ways in which their continued docility is ensured until that time that they are pushed out of such employment. This is achieved not only through assumptions around women’s ‘cheaper’
labour (both real and imagined), through which MNCs are enticed in the first place, but more importantly by sustaining a vision of the female worker as a member of a large family, a family ruled by fathers and brothers/supervisors and managers. These women, moreover, because of prevailing social attitudes about the role of young women, are employable for only a few short years, after which time they may return to their family homes in rural areas or turn to prostitution in the larger urban centres in which they find themselves.

Finally, Enloe draws a series of links between the adoption of IMF austerity measures and the capacity of women to respond to those measures. She argues that a government's ability to maintain its legitimacy depends at least in part on the capacity of families to tolerate those measures, specifically on the capacity of women to stretch their budgets, to continue to feed, clothe, and care for their families. This may include severe domestic financial management as well as travelling abroad as foreign domestic servants, often with the requirement that a significant proportion of their salaries be repatriated back to the home country. As Enloe argues, IMF austerity measures depend on these women and the choices they are forced to make.

Thus the politics of international debt is not simply something that has an impact on women in indebted countries. The politics of international debt won’t work in their current form unless mothers and wives are willing to behave in ways that enable nervous regimes to adopt cost-cutting measures without forfeiting their political legitimacy.\(^{41}\)

A dynamic is set up around ideas about what women will and will not do, the actual material conditions of their lives, and the policies produced by international organizations and foreign governments. This dynamic both sustains and is dependent on assumptions about what are considered the appropriate roles and qualities of women, and women of particular races, in specific times and places.

When women do travel abroad to work as foreign domestic servants, they often face unregulated and unsupervised workplace environments with less than subsistence wages, in countries where labour and citizenship rights are differentially applied, and in some instances they are subject to sexual and physical assault. Yet, assumptions about work, familial relations, and race are again used to justify lower pay and different rights from those of other workers. The terms of work are shaped in part by the fact that foreign domestic servants are employed in the home and perform work (child-rearing, housecleaning, cooking, and so on) that is not normally recognized as such. Ideologies about ‘family’ join with assumptions around race, and as Abigail Bakan and Daiva Stasinlus note, ‘racialized images of womanhood play an important role in justifying to employers why non-white women of colour are “naturally” suited for childcare and housework.’\(^{42}\)

The point here, of course, is that pressures to work as a foreign domestic servant derive in part from the pressures of the global capitalist system, the structural adjustment policies imposed by international financial institutions, and the historical legacy of imperialism and colonialism in many developing countries. Those pressures not only depend on women acting in a certain way, as Enloe describes, but, once having decided to work as a foreign domestic servant, a woman is involved in a complex of issues that includes assumptions about femininity, citizenship, and the transformation of a ‘family home’ into a workplace, and all of these are informed by gendered and racialized attitudes.\(^{43}\) Or, as Jan Jindy Pettman more
bluntly states: ‘Domestic service has long been the site for “close encounters” between colonising and coloniser women.’

International organizations more generally are also involved in promoting and sustaining assumptions around gender relations. Marilyn Waring has documented in considerable detail the ways in which women and women’s work are made almost completely invisible within the United Nations System of National Accounts (UNSNA). This invisibility is important, she argues, because national governments and international agencies decide what is important, both politically and economically, based in part on the various measures found within the UNSNA; for example, when aid donors use the UNSNA to decide which countries are the most ‘needy’ and which projects are the most important; when governments determine economic policy priorities based on UNSNA figures; and when multinational corporations decide where, whether, and how to invest internationally based on what is recorded in the UNSNA. More importantly, Waring notes, the meanings associated with women’s work are fundamentally affected: women, by virtue of their absence in standard measures of work, are understood not to be involved in productive activities, despite the fact that they may be collecting food and fuel and caring for children and home from well before dawn to well after dusk. This has an impact on those women’s lives, for the absence of women and women’s work from these figures, and from the meaning of work at all, makes it very convenient to ignore their interests, concerns, and demands and, as Enloe has noted, to ‘cheapen’ the various forms of work that women are involved in.

Chandra Talpade Mohanty develops the notion of the meanings attached to women’s work in specific locales even further. In her analysis of the lacemakers of Narsapur and electronics workers in Silicon Valley, she notes how gender and race and caste-based ideologies inform understandings of work, workers, and leisure-time activities. Seclusion and purdah, she notes, are a sign of higher status, and lacemaking in Narsapur came to be associated with higher-caste women but was linked also to the assumption that these women were just sitting in the house. As Mohanty writes, ‘The caste-based ideology of seclusion and purdah was essential to the extraction of surplus value.’ But she goes further:

Ideologies of seclusion and the domestication of women are clearly sexual, drawing as they do on masculine and feminine notions of protectionism and property. They are also heteronormative ideologies, based on the normative definition of women as wives, sisters, and mothers—always in relation to conjugal marriage and the ‘family’.

This same dynamic is at work, she argues, in Silicon Valley where the work done by Third World women is described as ‘easy as a recipe’, tedious, and a ‘supplementary activity for women whose main tasks were mothering and housework’. ‘There is a clear connection between low wages and the definition of the job as supplementary’, Mohanty writes, ‘and the fact that the lifestyles of people of color are defined as different and cheaper.’

In addition to analysing the assumptions about women and work, some feminist analyses explore also the ways in which particular assumptions about men are embedded within the practices associated with work. This is well illustrated by the efforts of international organizations such as the ILO to promote protective legislation for women during pregnancy. Such legislation is usually aimed at prohibiting heavy lifting during pregnancy or removing women from workplaces in which they might be exposed to substances hazardous to their pregnancy, such as lead or benzene. Such protection is, of course, laudable
in many respects. As Zillah Eisenstein notes, pregnancy is engendered; women do, or may, bear children. This fact already structures their choices within the labour force, and protective legislation that recognizes pregnancy may protect some women from further discrimination based on it.\textsuperscript{51} But at the same time, a number of tensions emerge, one of which is that protective legislation that removes women from reproductive health hazards leaves men subject to those same hazards.

As early as 1860, the reproductive effects on men exposed to lead were documented with indications that their wives had a very high incidence of spontaneous abortion. More recently, lead and other substances have been linked to low sperm counts, childhood cancers, heart defects, genetic damage to sperm, and chromosomal aberrations.\textsuperscript{52} With the assumption that only women play an important enough role in reproduction to require protection, it becomes clear that men’s role in reproduction does not entitle them to any sort of special consideration—they become, in effect, invisible. In short, women are recognized not as workers, but only insofar as they are childbearers, and men are ignored insofar as they are involved in reproduction. Men are in both a privileged and invisible position through this sort of protective legislation: privileged because it is normally men with whom women are compared, and invisible because they do not exist outside of this category, that of the ‘normal’ worker.

Conclusions

The above examples illustrate briefly the ways in which quite traditional IPE issues, such as debt management, export processing zones, divisions of labour, and protective labour legislation are informed by assumptions around gender. More specifically, what they illustrate is how ‘ideas about the “naturalness” of forms of gender inequality are integral to understanding how the international economy functions.’\textsuperscript{53} It is this naturalness that V. Spike Peterson argues is being challenged, both by feminist analyses and by the very structural transformations of the global political economy that many of those feminists seek to analyse. Thus, not only are IR and IPE experiencing a renewed ‘theoretical effervescence’,\textsuperscript{54} as was discussed above, but dramatic changes within the so-called ‘real world’ have produced a crisis in both our thinking and practices around international relations. The end of the Cold War, economic realignments, and many of the other issues raised by the authors in this volume suggest that, at the very least, the ways in which gender relations are maintained and constructed will be made clear, for it is in periods of crisis that prevailing notions become threatened. As Peterson writes:

gender is hard to see and critique because it orders ‘everything’ and disrupting that order feels threatening—not only at the ‘level’ of institutions and global relations but also in relation to the most intimate and deeply etched beliefs/experiences of personal (but relentlessly gendered) identity. Yet, however much we are uncomfortable with challenges to gender ordering, we are in the midst of them. Failure to acknowledge and address these challenges both impairs our understanding of the world(s) we live in and sustains relations of domination.\textsuperscript{55}

Feminist interrogations of gender thus can, and should, become a regular feature of the landscapes of both IR and IPE.

Notes

Susan Strange, Presidential Address to the International Studies Association, 1995. Though these comments were deleted from the published version of her address, Strange’s remarks are reported in Craig Murphy, ‘Seeing Women, Recognizing Gender, Recasting International Relations’, International Organizations 50,3 (Summer 1996): 532.


Fred Halliday, ‘Hidden from International Relations: Women and the International Arena’, Millenium 17, 3 (Winter, 1988): 419. See also other essays in this special edition of Millenium.

This argument is made about critical international relations theory in my ‘Gender in the International Paradigm Debate’, Millenium 18, 2 (summer 1989): 265-72.

Paraphrased from Nancy Fraser, ‘What’s the Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender’, in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell, eds, Feminism and Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 31.


Fukumana, ‘Women and the Evolution of World Politics’, 27; emphasis added.


Jones’ essay won the British International Studies Association graduate student essay prize for 1996. It is worth noting that Jone’s general point is a good one; that is, that analyses concerned with gender need to address prevailing assumptions of both men and women and the effects that those assumptions have. It is a point made by numerous feminist scholars. As Jan Jindy Pettman writes, IR ensures that ‘most men and all women are erased from view.’ Jan Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996), viii; see also selections from my own Feminism and International Relations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), esp. ch. 5.


Ibid., 199.


Ibid., 49, 58.


22. Ibid.


30. Ibid. See also Barbara Rogers, *The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Countries* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979).


32. See, for example, Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism’.


36. Ibid., 37.
39. Ibid., 36-7.
40. Ibid., ch. 7.
41. Ibid., 185.
43. Bakan and Stasiulus, 40-3 and passim.
44. Pettman, Worlding Women, 189.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 15-16.
49. Ibid., 17. See also Eileen Boris and Elisabeth Prügl, Homeworkers in Global Perspective (New York: Routledge, 1996).
50. This is drawn from my Feminism and International Relations, ch. 5.
Suggested Readings


Web Sites


Gender, Science and Technology: http://www.ifias.ca/GSD/GSDinfo.html

Women in Development Network: http://www.focusintl.com/widnet.htm


UNIFEM: http://www.unifem.org/

Coalition Against Trafficking in Women: http://www.catwinternational.org/

International Organization Migration (IOM) Trafficking Project: http://www.focus-on-trafficking.net/

Regional Summit on Foreign Domestic Workers, Sri Lanka http://caramasia.gn.apc.org/Regional_Summit_MainPage.htm

The Institute for Policy Studies Campaign for Migrant Domestic Workers Rights (US): http://www.ips-dc.org/campaign/WhoWeAre.htm
Since the agents of global domination were, and are, predominantly men, the historical analysis of masculinity must be a leading theme in our understanding of the contemporary world order. —Robert W. Connell. This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.