Explaining the Settlement Project: We Know More, But What More Should We Know?

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Much of the work on the various post-1967 Israeli settlement projects places them within broader frameworks. For example, Ian S. Lustick, whose earlier work (1985, 1988) had a sharper focus on the settlers, expanded his analysis and in his 1993 magnum opus *Unsettled States* embedded the settlement issue within the broader question of state expansion and contraction. Ilan Peleg1 (1995) wrote a comprehensive chapter on the West Bank and Gaza settlement project, as part of a project on human rights in these regions. Arye Naor (2001) mentioned the settlements in the context of the sources of Greater Israel ideology, and Eyal Weizman (2007) looked at them as part of his analysis of the architecture of control.

These scholarly choices reflected a sense that the settlement project was a secondary issue on the overly packed agenda of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, compared to the matters that have weighed on the relationship over the years, such as the decades-long mutual non-recognition, the settlement issue was perceived as a subset of the future borders demarcation question. This situation is no longer the case, and the recent publication of the volumes discussed below is a reminder of this new reality.2

Between the final demise of the Oslo Accords in 2001, and the rise to power of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2006, the settlements became a central issue for both right and left in Israel. The Israeli left tried to label the second Intifada as “the war for the settlements’ security” (Diamant 2004; Ezrahi 2000: 251), while Prime Minister Sharon chose to seal his career’s legacy by removing all settlers from Gaza and the northern West Bank.

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The focused attention on the settlement issue is an important development. After all, the settlements question is central to any debate about a negotiated two-state solution. Their creation serves for Palestinians as daily proof that Zionism is an expansionist project, thus deepening even further the conflict between the two parties. On the ground, the settlements’ erection created an “artificially manufactured Bosnia” (Gorenberg 2006: 365) that would make “any attempt to draw a border through it in order to separate the two peoples” a source of “bitter struggles and agony” (Zertal and Eldar: xv). Finally, the tensions between Palestinians and settlers on the ground are a source of daily clashes in the West Bank.

The late realization that the settlements are a central “stand alone” question perhaps explains Zertal and Eldar’s assertion that “even though the settlements have been engaging governments, the media, and scholars here [Israel] and abroad … to this day no single comprehensive book has been written in Hebrew or in any other language on the settlements” (xvi).

The 2005 Hebrew original of the Zertal and Eldar book was the first to signal the post-Oslo interest in an exclusive focus on the settlement project. Like the Hebrew version, the 2007 updated English version is an exhaustive volume. Its 531 pages are divided into three parts. The first includes three narrative chapters (1–3) that trace the story of the settlements from 1967 to 2001. The second part contains four chapters (4–7) that analyze key themes dealing mostly with national religious settlers: the ideological sources of Gush Emunim, the use of death in settler mobilization, the relationship between the settlers and the military, and the interaction between the legal system and the settlement project. The last part, an epilogue, includes one chapter (8) that brings the story up to 2007. This last chapter further discusses some of the thematic issues that are analyzed in the second part of the book. Much of the work is based on primary documents, organized in a manner that captures both a narrative history and its underlying driving and enabling conditions.

Zertal and Eldar explain the settlement project as one that emerged within Israel as a result of a “two-pronged development,” one prong being the national-religious “settlement movement” and the other being the “gradual collapse of the state’s institutions, whether by choice or out of weakness in the face of messianic zeal that burst into the public sphere after June 1967” (xvii). The authors effectively deconstruct the various tensions out of which the national religious settler movement of Gush Emunim grew. They point to the “contradictions inherent in the very structure of the state of Israel” (184) and to the settlers’ eschatological, “mystical” worldview that was advanced through with a “rational” set of actions (184).

Zertal and Eldar do not hide their normative judgment. At times, their text reads like a highly informative indictment of the settlement project. For example, they suggest that the settlements in effect led Israel to be “less democratic, less humane, less rational … poorer, more divided, and more hateful” (xviii). Their normative
starting point affects, perhaps, the book’s focus as they state in the introduction that their project is comprehensive only as regards to “the Israeli Perspective” (xvi).

Zertal and Eldar argue for a clear line separating the state of Israel from the territories, and the settlers from the rest of the Israeli public. However, their description highlights also how these lines are becoming blurred over time. They admit that the settlement project “torments [Israeli society] … with the question of whether this blend of messianic belief with political astuteness and stunts of, or bursts of, irrationality with cutting edge organizational and operational skill, of violence and law breaking with sweet talk and self righteous discourse … has defined Israeli society as a whole” (244).

Huberman’s two-volume history of the settlements in the West Bank is the least scholarly among the three books reviewed here. It does not include footnotes or an index, and it contains only one-and-a-half pages of bibliography. Nevertheless, it provides a coherent narrative of the development of the project. Perhaps its larger contribution is the window it opens onto the perspective of the mainstream national religious settlers. Indeed, of the three books discussed, this is the closest to an “official history” as told by the self-selected elite of the settler movement. Huberman’s work begins with an introduction by Hanan Porat, a prominent national religious settler leader and is dedicated to Ido Zoldan, a settler who was killed by Palestinians in November 2007.

From Huberman’s perspective, the settlement project was initiated by a small group of national religious Israelis, a modern-day Zionist avant-garde who were set to settle the frontier in quest of personal, communal, and national redemption. This notion is best captured by Huberman when he quotes a speech given by Ariel Sharon in 2001: “in each period in the history of Zionism there is a small leading group … a group that at the beginning and in the many years afterwards is highly criticized … in the last twenty three years it is Amana” (463). Contrast this with Zertal and Eldar’s suggestion that Israel is “being crushed from within and is increasingly the subject of bitter controversy abroad because of the settlements” (x).

Like many revolutionary movements, Huberman’s also faced impediments to its vision: a hostile international environment, a critical Israeli public, and numerous reluctant-to-unsympathetic Israeli governments. Huberman, the true believer, argues that in many cases opposition to the settlement projects was driven by wrongful personal motives. For example, Ephraim Sneh, a Deputy Defense Minister who was deemed hostile to the project, wasa “former Communist, son of a Communist” (380).

At the same time, a repeated motif in Huberman’s book is settler disappointment with Israeli right-wing leaders, who withdrew their support from the movement once Menachem Begin was elected prime minister. Shortly after coming to power in 1977, Begin elated the settlers when he famously promised “many Alonei Moreh.” But when he told settler leader Hanan Porat that under American pressure
he was unable to fulfill his promise, the former allies “parted in great tension ... and their paths separated forever” (131).

Despite his description of the settlers’ leadership role in the project, Huberman’s narrative demonstrates, in effect, the pattern identified by Zertal and Eldar: the settlement project was born out of a relationship between settlers and government. For example, Huberman reports how over the years many settlers have held positions in the public institutions that had authority over their development.

Huberman’s almost exclusive focus on the national religious settlers offers an in-depth understanding of this community. It hints at tensions between them and the two other large groups of settlers: secular and Ultra Orthodox. In some cases we are told of tensions within settlements between religious and secular, like the case of Telem (near Hebron), where secular settlers made a point of driving on the Jewish Sabbath in order to provoke their more observant neighbors (444). Similarly, the Ultra Orthodox settlement of Matzad refused for a long time to allow national religious settlers to occupy a potential unauthorized outpost on Matzad’s outskirts, even when local Bedouins “plundered” forty caravans that were not being used by the Ultra Orthodox (402). Huberman also hints at tensions between moderates and hard-liners among the national religious leadership. For example, in two separate cases, he describes critically the costs of aggressive actions taken by Daniela Weiss, who was secretary general of Gush Emunim in the late 1980s.

Gershom Gorenberg’s book is narrower in scope and discusses only the first decade of the settlement project (1967–1977). Like Huberman’s work, this book is mostly a narrative. Gorenberg does add, however, insightful observations about the personalities, institutions, and communities involved. The international environments, in particular the US, are important players. Drawing on cables and memos, public statements, and interviews, Gorenberg shows how working-level US diplomats opposed the settlement project from its inception, but also how the American leadership did not pay much attention under President Johnson, due to the preoccupation with the Vietnam War. Later, under President Nixon, there was a desire not to pressure Israel because, according to Nixon’s worldview: “the Middle East was one corner of the cold war chess board ... the United States made sure that its rook—Israel—stood firm without retreating” (57).

Gorenberg is the only author who deals with the Golan Heights settlers in depth. His treatment of these settlers is a contribution to the literature on settlements not simply because it includes another region where settlement activity occurred, but also because it demonstrates a dynamic that is highlighted in the two other books: the interaction between determined settlers and an indecisive government grappling with various strategic and ideological considerations.

The close description of the events from 1967 to 1977 allows Gorenberg to offer new ways to organize an analysis of the settlement project. Like Zertal and Eldar, he highlights internal tensions in Zionism and in Israeli political culture that al-
lowed the settlers to be so effective. He also points to the evolution of the legacy argument used by settlers to justify their project. First, there was an immediate legacy claim made by the children of settlers relocated by the Jordanians from Kfar Etzion in 1948. Then, in 1968, Jews settled in Hebron, based on the city’s dual legacy: the immediate past of the 1929 massacre of the Jewish community there, and the ancient biblical memories. Finally, settlements in Samaria drew mostly on the mythical biblical legacy of the region.

Gorenberg delivers a person-driven text. His writing style is one that does not lose sight of the role of the individual, even among the secular and religious collectivist movements he is analyzing. Gorenberg’s ability to identify personal traits of larger-than-life actors (e.g., Yigal Allon, Yisrael Galili) reflects an empathetic tone. The book captures a wide breadth of human experience when it comes to the settlement project. It is a tone different from the harshness embodied in the settler versus left-wing clash that comes out of Zertal and Eldar and Huberman’s volumes. Whether or not it was his intent, intent, but Gorenberg’s tone is also an invitation to take another path toward resolving the internal Israeli conflict over the fate of the territories: an attempt to achieve true empathy for the fears, hopes, and dreams of the other party, and a realization that not only ideologies, but also people, drive this conflict.

How do these books fit into what we know now about the launch and development of the settlement project? Existing explanations fall into two broad categories: internal and bilateral/bi-communal (Israeli-Palestinian). Internal explanations include suggestions that the settlement project: (1) was drive by the settlers; (2) was a government policy intended to tie the hands of future governments; (3) or was determined by an institutional and ideological path established in earlier periods of Zionism. The bilateral (or bi-communal) arguments stress the functional role of the settlement project in Israel’s social control over the territories, or as a part of a negotiation strategy with the Palestinians.

**Internal Explanation: Gush Emunim**

The suggestion that national religious civic society groups drove the settlement project belongs to a category of literature that views territorial expansion, including settler activity, as a process initiated by geographically or politically peripheral groups as opposed to one directed from the center. Galbraith, for example, explained the nineteenth-century territorial expansion of the British empire as driven not by the economic forces that directed territorial expansion from the empire’s center, but by actors on the periphery (414). Similarly, Sileby (2005) showed how tens of thousands of Americans settled (1821–1836) in Mexican Texas “in pursuit of their own economic well being” (7).
In the Israeli context, the national religious movement of Gush Emunim occupied the spot of the peripheral self-perpetuated group that drove the project. Huberman’s text reflects this approach. Zertal and Eldar (xvii) share, in effect, Huberman’s explanation though add to it. As noted, in their view, the settlers’ energy was successfully transformed into a viable project only because of the “gradual collapse of the state’s institutions by choice or out of weakness” (xvii). Gorenberg’s account is less explicit in its conclusions. After all, his work deals with a decade that saw the creation of only a handful of national religious settlements: the Labor-run state was still the most dominant actor when it came to settlement creation, and the national religious settlers were still unorganized members of a peripheral group in society.

In the introduction to Huberman’s book, Hanan Porat reflects on the internal motivations of the national religious settlers. First, the settlement project served the national religious as a group, moving it to the front rows of the Zionist endeavor. For Porat, the settlement project was a watershed after which “religious Zionism … strove to become a bridge head that … sets the path to the country as a whole” (7). At the same time, the settlement project, for Porat, was the first step in a grander eschatological scheme of a “Zionism of Redemption” that would redefine the Jewish national movement as a project that has qualities of “re-creating the kingdom of David and the construction of the Temple as key elements in mending the world in the kingdom of God” (Huberman 2008: 7). Gorenberg identifies these ideological underpinnings and hints at his own normative stance: the chapter devoted to the rise of Gush Emunim is called “Mere Anarchy Is Loosed.”

But the internal self-perpetuated explanation is insufficient. First, even today, despite their media and political visibility, national religious settlers account for a minority (perhaps as low as 10% to 15% of the total settler population) and constitute an even a smaller percentage in the project’s first decade. Second, most of the public goods needed for the project—land and security—were provided by the state. Settler leaders are fully cognizant of that reality. Indeed, Yisrael Harel, perhaps the most visible face of the national religious settlers, wrote in the Israeli daily Ha’aretz in 2008 that “It would have been impossible to develop hundreds of settlements … without the agreement of Israel’s governments, and especially without broad public support.”

Heritage Driven: Path Dependency and the Genetic Code of a Settler Society

A second explanation is that the settlement project was a result of a path established years earlier. This argument comes in cultural and institutional forms. Culturally, Porat suggests in his preface to the Huberman book that “in many ways, the settle-
ment in *Yehuda Ve’Shomron*, continue the great settlement project that preceded it in the annals of Zionism, both before and after the state of Israel was created” (6). Taken a bit further, this argument suggests that Zionism’s ethos of settling the frontier was so powerful that once a new frontier was opened in 1967, this ethos compelled some sectors of society to embark on a new settlement project. The cultural explanation is limited, as most observers of Israeli society admit that by the time the settlement project was launched, Israeli elites lost their revolutionary Zionist zeal and gave preference to either advancing existing state institutions (like the armed forces) or to pursuing individualism. For example, reflecting on this development, a disappointed Yigal Allon wrote in 1959 that “the eyes of the youth today are turned today to the ease of life and incorrect social values” (259).

The institutional path dependent explanation suggests that the set of organizations created by the Zionist movement in the pre-1948 era to develop new settlements found in the settlement project a new rationale for their existence and therefore advanced the project in the new territories. Primary among these organizations is the Settlement Department in the Jewish Agency. Although there is no doubt that the existence of an effective settlement apparatus made the launch of the project easier, this cannot be the sole reason. If the institutions by themselves were the driver of the project, we should have observed settlement activity in other unsettled parts of Israel, most notably in its vast (and largely empty) Negev Desert and its northern sector, the Galilee. But the decade before the 1967 War saw the creation of only nineteen new settlements, compared with 368 new settlements created between 1948 and 1957 (Gvati 1981: 143, 139).

Finally, in arguing that the post-1967 settlement project was merely an extension of earlier Zionist settlement efforts, we should be aware of differences in terms of the goals and the role of the state in implementing them. In the pre-1948 era, the strategic goal of the Zionist movement was to develop the settlements in order to secure territorial expansion or the creation of a territorial base for the Jewish national movement. Yet the mandatory state did not “transfer lands to the Jews” (Biger 1983: 176) initially and later placed limits on some Jewish land acquisitions from Arabs. After the state was created in 1948, settlement activity (“the new settlements”) was expanded but was intended to provide housing solutions for over a million immigrants who had come to the Jewish state in the years following its creation as well as to develop an agricultural infrastructure that could secure food supplies (Weitz 1967: 116). During this period, the state played an active role in providing access to the land that was used for settlements. The “third wave” of settlements post-1967 is indeed similar in its goals to the pre-state phase (rather than to the 1948–1967 era) as both served a strategic goal of territorial expansion. However, the post-1967 phase is similar to the 1948–1967 era in that the state was the primary source of land.
Government Driven: Audience Costs

The third internal explanation for the choice of the settlements as a tool of territorial expansion is audience costs. Although the argument about a self-perpetuated project leaves little room for government agency, the audience costs argument asserts that the government was the main instigator of the project for internal forward-looking reasons. Based on insights from Fearon (1994), the audience costs argument suggests that consecutive Israeli governments placed settlers in the West Bank and Gaza as a state expansion strategy aimed at its own political system. According to this approach, the state organs believed that the deployment of a large number of settlers would create a set of new interests—those of the settlers—that would force future governments to hold onto the territories. Meron Benvenisti articulated this argument in a 1983 piece in the New York Review of Books when he described Likud strategy regarding the settlements as “aimed at creating internal political facts, not geostrategic facts” (16). Yet this argument’s explanatory power is limited, at least for the period under review in Gorenberg’s book. The audience costs argument is based on the assumption that the current government’s calculations are driven by concerns that it may lose power and that its existing policies may be reversed. However, the 1967–1977 Labor governments that initiated and led the project during its first decade did not expect to lose power and therefore had no policies in place for such an eventuality. Moreover, the small number of settlers placed in the West Bank until 1977 (about 4,400, excluding Jerusalem) could not have possibly created a serious internal coalition that would prevent any future settler removal. Especially, as many of these settlements were military controlled Nahal outposts manned by conscripts.

Bilateral Explanations

Bilateral explanations suggest that the settlement project grew out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first bilateral explanation is that the settlement project was intended to support Israeli political domination over the indigenous Palestinian population. Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001) suggested that state use of population transfers “as a strategy for establishing … control is an ancient practice” and called it “population addition” (57). Settling a loyal population in a newly occupied area supported social control in a four major ways: (1) it buttressed the legitimacy of the occupation by the local population, by virtue of adding a loyal population in the occupied area; (2) settlers served as a “natural recruitment pool for staffing for administrative positions within the local state bureaucracy” (Lustick 1985: 81); (3) settlements served as bases for local control, both as a haven and as an infrastruc-
ture for military and police forces; (4) settlements created a physical barrier that intersected the occupied region and made it easier to control.

These explanations are limited in the Israeli context. It is no wonder that they are marginal at best in the books discussed. After all, the project was launched and advanced during two decades (between 1967 and 1987) in which the local Palestinian population did not challenge Israeli control in any meaningful way, with the brief exceptions of the 1969–1971 Gaza Palestinian campaign. Although the PLO had encouraged resistance to Israeli control since 1967, its actions in the territories were limited. Indeed, the memoirs of senior Israeli security officials reveal a number of strategies used against the limited Palestinian armed challenge, but do no mention the settlements as one of them (Pundak 2000; Ronen 1989).

**Negotiation**

A second inter-communal explanation points to the role of the settlements in a future Israeli-Palestinian negotiation. First, some suggested that the settlements served as a “fading opportunity that could induce the Arabs to come to the negotiation table” (Mnookin and Eiran 2005: 35), lest “less negotiable land would be left” (Gazit 2003: 242). Further, Israel's expectation was that once the negotiation would begin, the settlement could serve as a “bargaining chip” to be traded for other assets. However, during the first six years of the Israeli settlement project Israel did not set negotiations with the Arab world as a priority. Defense minister Dayan famously stated that Israel is waiting for a call from the Arabs and that Israel “can live without peace” (Dayan 1969: 40). In any event, as the books reviewed above remind us, if this was the policy of the Israeli government, it did not pan out very well. The pieces on the chess board assumed agency and played a crucial role in hindering domestic support for a peace deal with the Palestinians (Mnookin and Eiran 2005: 35).

**Needed: A Comprehensive Research Project**

The three books discussed all make significant contributions to the development of a historical narrative of the settlement project. Zertal and Eldar further add an analysis of crucial aspects. Yet none of the books purports to be a comprehensive description and analysis of the project in time, space, or in terms of the humans agents that shaped it. If we are to devise such a project, what else should we add?

First, we need a better understanding of the effect of the international environment on the launch and development of the settlement project. The books discussed remind us that international concerns were present in national decision-
making processes regarding the settlements. For example, Prime Minister Rabin, justified his compromise with the Sebastia settlers in 1975 by pointing to its proximity in time to the United Nations General Assembly resolution to equate Zionism with racism (Goldstein 2006: 281). However, there is no systematic analysis of this crucial aspect.

Two specific issues that are grounded in the international arena warrant further analysis. (1) What was the effect of the status of the territories in international law on the launch of the settlement projects? Specifically, the fact that by 1967 both the West Bank and Gaza had gone through five decades of separation between sovereign and ruler. Did this encourage Israel to launch its project there? Yigal Allon tied the strength of a claim for sovereignty to possible Israeli future expansion when he suggested in 1959 that “if the Israel Defense Force is ever to cross into sovereign Arab territories for military purposes, there is no doubt that it would need to relinquish control over them … [but] the same rule does not apply to Gaza and Alexandria” (Allon 1959: 82). After Israel gained control of the territories, Prime Minister Eshkol explained in an interview with *Newsweek* in February 1969 that “in 1948 Jordan occupied the West Bank, while breaching a UN resolution, we then occupied it from Jordan” (Lammfrumm 2002: 657). (2) How was Israel able to launch and advance the settlement project despite the American position that saw it as illegal (until 1981) and as an obstacle to peace? Gorenberg suggests that the settlements were a minor item on the agenda of the emerging strategic alliance. How much, then, did Washington’s contradictory positions play a role in Israeli decisions to create the settlements?

Second, the Palestinians are largely missing from most literature on the settlements. If indeed the settlements were intended to expand Israeli territory into the West Bank and Gaza, we need a better understanding of the Palestinian response. How did the Palestinian national movement deal with the challenge? How did the tension between the “outside” (comprised mostly of refugees) and the “inside” (mostly in the West Bank) leaderships affect the Palestinian policy? What role did Palestinians play in the development of settlements through land sales and labor? How did the settlers interact with their immediate environment? What—if any—were the economic effects of the settlements on the local Palestinian population?

Third, much of the Israeli literature focuses on the national religious sector among the settlers. Zertal and Eldar concede that they did not discuss “the massive number of quality of life settlers … Jerusalem [settlements], as well as the story of the settlements in the Golan Heights, and Gaza” (Hebrew version: XV). Similarly, there is little discussion of the group that is now the largest contributor to new settlers—the Ultra Orthodox.

Fourth, a serious omission in all the works on the settlements is the inability to offer a complete picture of the costs. This is largely a data collection problem, to
which both Gorenberg (364) and Zertal and Eldar admit (xxi). Work by Swirski (2005) and the Macro Center (2010) may serve as a useful starting point.

Finally, a less passionate analysis may be more beneficial. Much of the literature about the settlements reflects the authors’ normative position and even emotions regarding the project. Huberman is an open supporter of the settlement project, while Zertal and Eldar do not hide their negative judgment and feelings. Perhaps a more empathetic tone would be constructive in the internal Israeli debate. It may also allow for the advancement of our knowledge by facilitating a discussion that is not suspected to be serving polemics.

The US-Israeli clash over settlement expansion in 2009 was yet another reminder of the centrality of the question of the settlements. The three books discussed here try to close the gap between the significance of the issue on the political agenda and the limited research that exists on it. They all add much to our understanding, while reminding us what else is needed and what more should be done. Studying the settlements is not an easy matter. It is highly politicized and arouses great emotion. However, regardless of where one stands on the issue, most would agree that it might determine Israel’s future. It warrants, therefore, our continued attention.

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Notes

1. Like Lustick, Peleg is a former president of the Association of Israel Studies.
2. There have been over the years a number of exceptions, such as Meron Benvenisti’s work.
3. Amana is the settling arm of Gsuh Emunim.
4. Eyal Weizman’s book Hollow Land (2007) may be the first sign of a possible third, perhaps post-modern, approach. Weizman argues that the project’s development should not be analyzed as a coherent action but rather as a set of
tensions, a “structured chaos,” in which “the selective absence of government intervention promotes an unregulated process of violent dispossession” (5).

5. Galbraith further explained that this was a self-perpetuating process as “governors continued to try and eliminate the disorderly frontier by annexation which in turn produced new frontier problems and further expansion” (1973: 415).

6. Yeats’s apocalyptic poem “The Second Coming” is used by a number of writers who analyze Israeli society and its conflict with the Palestinians. Gorenberg uses it as his epigram, as does Tzvia Greenfeld in They Are Afraid (2005), and Amos Elon in his 1997 A Blood Dimmed Tide.

7. A potential counter-claim would be that although they did not constitute the bulk of the settlers, national religious settlers led the project and had an effect on their population expansion. However, the data shows that the elected leadership of the big towns that constitute the largest numbers of settlers (Ariel, Ma’ale Edumim, Beitar Ilit) tended to have but limited cooperation with the national religious settlers.

8. There were also internal ideological reasons for pursuing settlement activity, such as contributing to the development of the “new Jew.”

9. Other actions the state took, like providing law and order, did assist in this goal.

10. In late 1969 the PLO launched a limited armed campaign in the Gaza Strip, which included mostly killing of collaborators, attacks on Israeli soldiers, and the use of IEDs. Between 1969 and 1971 there were 1,643 such attacks. Only sixteen Israeli soldiers and nineteen Israeli civilians were killed (Maimon 1993).

11. Israel’s response was a combination of a “hearts and minds” operation coupled with counter-insurgency measures. The “hearts and minds” efforts included increased access for Palestinians to the Israeli labor market, which paid higher salaries. The number of Gazans in employment in Israel rose from 10,000 in 1971 to 50,000 by 1973. Israel also built an industrial zone on its border to Gaza, which provided further employment (Pundak 2000: 294). Counter-insurgency moves included targeted assassinations and collective punishments (Pundak 2000: 335).

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