Joseph Jockel has done it again. He has again written the definitive book on the Canadian role in NORAD. His first book on the subject, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence*, was written in 1987 and was the premiere source on the development of the shared North American air and aerospace defences. With the release of *Canada in NORAD 1957-2007* he has now updated his original study. But this book does much more than simply modernize his previous work. It goes beyond simply telling the story of NORAD to the current date. Looking beyond the specifics of NORAD, Jockel provides an important assessment of how Canadian and American defence officials cooperate in an increasingly complicated international security environment. Thus, this book is an important addition to the literature on both NORAD and how Canadian defence policy is made.

Jockel makes it clear that NORAD has served Canada well. Despite the many ups and downs of the agreement over time, NORAD has become an important element (and even perhaps a symbol) of the Canadian-American defence relationship. While Canadian territory has become less and less important to the continental defence of North America, successive Canadian governments have continued to strongly support NORAD no matter what their political identification. This is because the benefits of the agreement become clear to all Canadian leaders who need to consider the merits of the agreement. These benefits include the provision of joint protection against the Soviet threat during the Cold War. A second important benefit has been the ongoing provision to Canadian officials of direct access to American thinking and technology.

Jockel makes it clear that this is a relationship of equals. To many outside observers, this may come as a surprise. Given the significant power difference that exists between Canada and the United States, Canada has been treated much better than some would expect. This has stemmed from the professionalism that the Canadian forces have brought to NORAD. Jockel makes it clear that the Americans have the highest regard for the ability and training of Canadian personnel, regardless of their rank or assignment. This respect also is due to the fact that Canadian leaders, despite the occasional outburst of nationalistic rhetoric, understand the importance and need for NORAD to be maintained.

The relationship also provides important insights into the demands that are now being placed on the Canadian-American security relationship. Jockel provides an excellent assessment of the manner in which the combined forces of (i) the end of the Cold War, (ii) the attacks of 9/11, and (iii) the shifting role of American power in the international security environment are altering the manner in which the Americans view the “special relationship.”
between the two states. While the relationship is still strong, it is clear from Jockel’s study that Canadian officials can no longer assume that Americans automatically accept the Canadian perspective. Canada is increasingly becoming just one of many American allies and/or friends. Thus, decisions to not participate in the war in Iraq or to not support ballistic missile defence (BMD) are viewed in much harsher terms by Washington than would have been the case during the Cold War when the relationship was stronger. As a result Canada should expect the next round of negotiations for the renewal of the NORAD Agreement to be more reflective of a United States that will be more concerned with its own interests and less concerned with those of Canada. As Jockel points out, this does not mean that Canadians should despair over the relationship, but rather should be prepared to take a more realistic view of it.

Perhaps of equal importance, this study also provides a fascinating study into how large, complex, and often cumbersome bureaucracies and militaries attempt to adapt to an ever-changing world. Geography and shared core interests have mandated that Canada and the United States cooperate in the defence of North American aerospace. But technology and evolving geopolitical factors have conspired to make such cooperation increasingly difficult to implement. Jockel makes it clear that NORAD did not appreciate the dangers posed by international terrorism and was therefore unprepared for the attacks on 9/11. The organization that had been designed to face a threat coming from the outside, had not reconsidered its needs in the decade in which the Soviet Union had collapsed. The various efforts to hijack aircraft prior to the attacks of 9/11 in increasingly bold attacks (such as the effort to hijack several aircraft at the same time in the Philippines and crash them into the ocean) should have warned NORAD leaders that a new threat was developing. NORAD officials should have understood that this new enemy was looking at innovative means of carrying the attack to the United States. But this did not happen. Jockel shows why this was the case. In so doing, he also shows interesting insights into how mature defence relationships sometimes are not able to move as quickly as may be needed in today’s environment.

Jockel also shows how the Americans failed to convince Canadian political leaders that there is a ballistic missile threat posed to both countries. It is clear that while some leaders such as Paul Martin may have been willing to accept the existence of such a threat, there was, at the same time, a significant and vocal section of the Liberal caucus that did not. This inability to convince all of the Liberal caucus of the need to defend against potential future ballistic missile threats meant that Martin had to eventually make a decision not to support the American plans. When this decision was made, new pressures were placed on NORAD. However, the sky did not fall and the Americans did accept the Canadian decision. But both Canadian and American officials needed to discover new ways of adjusting NORAD to allow the Americans to prepare for implementing BMD without Canadian involvement, while at the same time allowing NORAD to cooperatively prepare for aerospace threats. This has not been easy, but progress has been made.

Ultimately, this is a must-read book for anyone interested in NORAD and in the Canadian-American defence relationship. As always, Jockel has brought both his detailed research and his engaging style to again provide the definitive study on NORAD.
NORAD was created to manage the threat posed to North America by Soviet bombers. National security ofcials believed that the speed at which the bombers could arrive combined with the lethality of their nuclear payloads necessitated a rapid and coordinated response—one that did not require a separate negotiation as each incident developed. As Jockel points out, what made NORAD politically possible was the concept of “operational control.” This concept has never been well understood in either the United States or Canada. @article{Mason2011CanadaIN, title={Canada in NORAD 1957â€“2007: A History (review)}, author={Dwight N. Mason}, journal={Journal of Cold War Studies}, year={2011}, volume={13}, pages={219 - 221} }. Dwight N. Mason.