The decisions by Arab militaries played a crucial role in determining the outcomes of their countries’ protest movements. In some cases, such as Egypt and Tunisia, military leaders decided to refrain from using their violent power to crush protesters and instead to jettison the regime’s leadership. In others, such as Libya and Syria, despite widespread defections, the militaries remained largely loyal and willing to fight to the end. In Yemen, the military fractured, creating an overlay of armed conflict atop the dynamic of protester-regime. Explaining the variation in the responses of militaries to the outbreak of protest therefore is vital to understanding the overall course of the Arab uprisings.

Unfortunately, the political science literature is poorly equipped to address this pivotal question. The Arab world was a key region for investigating civil-military relations for some two decades following the coup d’état that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officer colleagues to power in Egypt in July 1952. But as military rule continued, analysts of the Arab world increasingly shunned that institution as a subject of study. Research access became increasingly difficult as Arab militaries burrowed further down into their respective political economies, obscuring their continued, powerful role of “ruling, but not governing.” In the meantime, the focus of political science literature on civil-military relations shifted from how militaries seize and exercise power to the role of militaries and security services in democratic transitions. Arab states, profoundly non-democratic, were irrelevant to this new interest in “transitology,” so they essentially disappeared from the academic field of civil-military relations and its new concern with civilian oversight and control. Even studies of
Arab authoritarian rule typically tended not to focus on the military. And where academic analysts feared to tread, the U.S. government was equally reticent. Although the Arab world received a disproportionate amount of U.S. funding to promote democracy, it received virtually no support to enhance civilian control of the militaries. The one study of Arab civil-military relations financed before the Arab spring by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) noted the politically important role of Arab militaries and their absorption of record shares of public budgets but questioned “the ripeness of many countries in the region for major programs in civil-military relations.”

Although the study of Arab militaries and their relationship with civilian political orders atrophied after the mid-1970s, investigations of Arab authoritarianism proliferated. One strand of this literature did make the case that a distinctive feature of Middle Eastern authoritarianism was the profound, enduring centralization of power by the military and associated security/intelligence organizations, coupled with the covert penetration of the rest of the state and the society and economy as well. The terms “shadow” and “deep” state, coined to describe this phenomenon with regard to Iraq and Turkey, respectively, refer to this extension into other institutions and arenas by armed forces through informal, clandestine means. So Middle Eastern and especially Arab exceptionalism was a reference not just to its authoritarianism but, at least for some analysts, also to the pervasiveness of subterranean networks of power emanating from coercive agencies.

Despite their concern with shadow or deep states, most analysts shied away from labeling Arab politics as “sultanistic,” a concept that incorporates the primary attributes of such states. Max Weber appropriated the term “sultanism” from his reading of Ottoman history to describe personalized, concentrated power heavily dependent on coercion, wherever it might be found. Those studying the Middle East have been less inclined to draw on and elaborate Weber’s characterization of sultanism than have specialists in other areas. This understandable reaction has, however, had costs for theorizing about Arab authoritarianism and the role of armed forces in it.

The first book-length effort by contemporary political scientists to develop the concept of sultanism and utilize it to compare contemporary political systems was that by H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, published in 1998. Of the six countries they investigated, only one, Iran, was Middle Eastern. According to Chehabi and Linz, the key characteristics of sultanism are blurring the distinction between regime and state, personalism, constitutional hypocrisy, narrow social bases, distorted capitalism, and particularly
problematic transitions to democracy. This last criterion is especially germane to the role of militaries in sultanistic regimes. Because of personalistic, top-down control, sultanistic militaries are said to be less likely to harbor reformers than are militaries in other types of authoritarian systems, so the prospects for alliances between reformers within and outside the state are limited. In the preceding year, Latin American specialist Alfred Stepan argued that of the different forms of authoritarian rule, sultanism was the least likely to undergo democratization, but he used only one Middle Eastern example. Linz's 2000 monograph does discuss some Middle Eastern countries, particularly those of the Maghreb, but not in the section on sultanistic regimes, in which he focuses on regimes in South and Central America. Over the past decade, a sprinkling of publications drawing on sultanism appeared, but the only Middle Eastern country that has been consistently analyzed in the monographs and journals in the conceptual framework of sultanism is Iran. In his thoughtful review of Chehabi and Linz's book, M. Crawford Young speculates on the applicability of sultanism, noting several countries in Africa to which it may have or might now apply, though only one of those mentioned, Libya, is Arab. In sum, Middle Eastern scholars stand out among area specialists for paying so little attention to Weber's concept of sultanism.

Paradoxically, if Weber had chosen a term with no Middle Eastern association, it is likely that his analysis of arbitrary, capricious, coercion-based authoritarian rule would have resonated with Middle East specialists. Linz's and Stepan's concentration on the particular challenges facing democratic transitions in sultanistic regimes and the potential for the “capture” of revolutions seems especially apposite in light of the Arab spring:

The extreme personalism and despotism of a [sultanistic] regime . . . facilitates the “capture” of a revolution by groups very close to the old regime . . . [as] new leaders, even if they had close links to the regime . . . advance the claim that the sultan was responsible for all of the evil.

Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak illustrates both the potential and the limits for such capture. The military high command under Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein Tantawi constituted itself as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and withdrew support from President Mubarak, thus sealing his fate. It then sought to distance itself from the negative aspects of the regime, of which it had been a vital component,
while preserving the military’s privileged role and even much of the essence of the regime itself. But the Tantawi-led SCAF proved to be so politically maladroit that its continued exercise of power began to threaten the military’s institutional interests. This in turn made possible a coalition of “military reformers”—in the sense that their strategy to preserve the status and power of the military was to form a coalition with the most powerful element of the opposition rather than seek to subdue it—led by General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Together they purged Tantawi and the SCAF in August 2012, before going on to impose a new constitution intended to perpetuate their joint rule. On July 3, 2013, Sisi turned on the Brotherhood and seized power for the military anew. General Tantawi’s capture strategy had failed because of diminished political capacities due to the longevity of Mubarak’s rule, the advanced age, and the political ineptitude of those pursuing the strategy. But younger officers within two years would preserve, even expand, the military’s powers.

Other Arab uprisings may not have witnessed such manifest attempts at capture by ancien régime elements, nor have they given rise to strong reformers able and willing to forge coalitions with revolutionaries. Defectors from the Libyan and Syrian officer corps, for example, may have wanted to be reformers, but shorn of command over their units by entrenched despots, they had little leverage. No visible, empowered reform elements have emerged in Bahrain. Those that did in Yemen resulted primarily from external pressure and support orchestrated by Saudi Arabia and the United States. Arab sultanistic regimes have clearly provided little space for reformist coalitions, an attribute inherent in the sultanism model.

The literature on sultanism thus provides suggestive hypotheses to guide research on the role of coercive forces in Arab politics. Narrowly focused on the mode by which power is exercised by a particular type of authoritarian leader, however, it ignores other important and determining political, economic, and even social factors. A comparison of responses by militaries to Arab uprisings, for example, suggests that a political system’s degree of institutionalization is a crucial variable. Accordingly, those in Tunisia and Egypt, the two most institutionalized of the republics, behaved markedly differently than did those in the other republics under threat from newly mobilized oppositions. In Tunisia, the military in fact sought to serve as a midwife of democracy, siding with the demonstrators against the security services loyal to President Zine al-Abdine Ben Ali and ultimately moving against the president himself. Then, having power in its hands, the Tunisian
military stood aside to enable the protesters to commence the task of building a new political order. This exemplary behavior resulted from both the relatively high degree of institutional coherence in Tunisia generally and in the army specifically, as well as a particular quirk of Ben Ali’s brand of sultanism. Neither he nor his predecessor trusted the military, so they based their coercive power on security and intelligence organizations, ensuring that the strikingly professionalized military remained small, underequipped, and under rather distant U.S. tutelage. In contrast, the security and intelligence forces were French trained and equipped, with Ben Ali much more confident of that country’s abiding support for his rule, as indeed turned out to be the case, as signaled by the French foreign minister’s offer in late December 2010 to beef up those forces against popular protests.

Similar to Ben Ali, Mubarak came to depend more heavily on the security and intelligence services within the Ministry of Interior to subdue political opposition, but unlike Ben Ali he controlled his military not by marginalizing it but by showering its officers with direct and indirect economic rewards. So as in Tunisia, the military had institutional interests apart from those of the president. Security and intelligence organizations served as the real “sword” of the sultan president and remained loyal to him to the end, indeed, maybe even past the end. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood appears to believe, for example, that the fulul, or remnants of those forces from the Mubarak era, not only provided the organizational resources for the June 2012 presidential campaign of Mubarak loyalist Ahmed Mohamed Shafik, but then in November and December of 2012 purposefully withdrew their protection of President Mohamed Morsi, newly ensconced in the presidential palace in Heliopolis, so as to allow the coalition of secular forces grouped into the National Salvation Front to bring more direct pressure on him.

Whether true or not, this interpretation suggests that like the military, the Egyptian security and intelligence forces have institutional interests in their own right. Because Mubarak had served those interests well, they stood by him. Unlike the military, which is a much stronger actor, the Brothers were required to strike a deal with it, and so the security and intelligence forces are now more vulnerable. They feared that the Brothers were less interested in a deal than in subduing them, so a covert struggle raged. Whatever the outcome, the very existence of this conflict is suggestive of the comparative institutionalization of intraregime politics in Egypt.

The coercive forces in other Arab republics were held together by personal loyalties anchored in social forces of tribe, ethnicity, and religion, not
by institutional interests reinforced by professional norms. Those loyalties nevertheless proved to be quite resilient. Yemen’s and Libya’s armies, much less cohesive and institutionalized than Tunisia’s and Egypt’s, ultimately did split to some degree under the pressure of demonstrations and then all-out attacks. But the bulk of forces remained loyal to President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi until the former was forced into a compromise and the latter out of his Tripoli bunker and then out of a drainpipe. Essentially extensions of their rulers’ households, as reflected in the fact that the rulers’ close kin were in key command positions, these militaries at their core were inseparable from the regime and the social force on which it was based. This was the source of both their strength and their weakness, as the Syrian case also demonstrates. President Bashar al-Assad, facing uprisings throughout the length and breadth of his country, could count on his Alawite compatriots but not on regular army units in which Sunni conscripts predominated, even though most officers were Alawites. Such units were typically assigned garrison duties. Increasingly President Assad came to rely for strike forces on the Alawite-dominated air force and elite Alawite brigades, as well as on gangs headed by Alawites, the shabiha, in his desperate attempt to subdue the uprising. Sultanic powers, constrained in Egypt and Tunisia by institutionalization, are limited in the other republics by the narrow base of the regime, resting as it does on a particular social force.

Thus far, none of the sultanic kings has faced divisions within his military or security services. The one case of sustained popular pressure on a ruling family, that of Bahrain, did result in conflict between the soft-line crown prince and the hard-line prime minister, but any possibility that the family or military might fracture was preempted by the Saudis’ military intervention. The subsequent declared intent to expand the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to include Jordan and Morocco seemed to suggest, among other things, that the Saudis and their Gulf allies were eager to add the substantial weight of those two countries’ armed forces to bolster Arab monarchical rule generally. In November 2012, for example, Kuwait reportedly had turned to Jordan for 3,500 security troops to stiffen its own coercive capacities in the face of ongoing protests. Apparently unwilling to place all his trust in Arab military forces, whether his own or others, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, was reported in May 2011 to have paid Erik Prince, founder of the infamous Blackwater Worldwide security firm, $529 million for a battalion of American-led mercenaries. Long a feature of sultanistic militaries, mercenaries are particularly
prevalent in the GCC states. The only known use of them in contemporary Arab republics was that by Qaddafi, whose African mercenaries’ tenacity may inspire other Arab heads of state, whether presidents or kings, to add foreign mercenaries to their armed forces as means of additional security against coups and control of oppositions.

In sum, the impact of sultanism on Arab civil-military relations was made evident by the Arab uprisings. With the partial exception of Tunisia, nowhere have reformers emerged from within the military or security services to forge coalitions with democratizers. In Egypt, the military and security services moved to secure their own positions. In the other republics challenged by uprisings, the sultanistic control of elite units drawn from the president’s own social force remained intact until the bitter end. In the monarchies, the sultanistic methods of control have been strengthened. The proposition that transitions to democracy from sultanism are particularly difficult has been confirmed. Nevertheless, the focus on methods of authoritarian control and their consequences, which is the essence of sultanism, is too narrow to account for the widely varying reactions by military and security forces to the challenges of the Arab uprisings. Other, systemic, factors also need to be taken into account.22

Context and Character of Arab Militaries

It may also be useful for “retheorizing” Arab militaries and informing speculation about where they are headed to examine the particular contexts in which they operate and the special features that differentiate the various Arab militaries. The crudest distinction—between monarchies and republics—does differentiate military type, means of control, and political and economic roles to some degree, as reflected by the events of the Arab uprisings. That no monarchial military or security service has turned on its ruler indicates that monarchs are politically stronger than presidents, that their societies are less mobilized, or that the monarchs are better able to control their armed forces.

Leaving aside the first two explanations, the third begs the question of what the differences are in the mechanisms of political control of armed forces. In reality they seem not to be systematic. Even though the GCC monarchies rely more heavily on mercenaries than do republics, neither Morocco nor Jordan do, and Qaddafi’s Libya did. Restricting the size of the military as a means of controlling it was true of Tunisia’s Ben Ali but is also the case in Morocco and, to a lesser extent, the statelets of the GCC.
That Morocco’s and Tunisia’s militaries have been comparatively small may reflect their Maghribi location as much as it does a means of control. Counterbalancing strategies are characteristic of both monarchs and presidents, as shown in the parallel structures of military and national guard in Saudi Arabia and in the oversized presidential security forces—the Republican Guards in Egypt and in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The use of security and intelligence forces as counterbalances to militaries does, however, seem to be more common and important in the republics, as demonstrated by the examples of Tunisia and Egypt, whose forces under Ben Ali and Mubarak came to substantially outnumber military personnel. But the security and intelligence forces of, say, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain also are substantial, suggesting that the difference is a matter of degree. Control through direct command by members of ruling families is exercised in all the monarchies except Morocco and Oman but also has been a feature of the Syrian, Yemeni, and Libyan regimes.

The extensive involvement of foreign militaries in procurement, training, logistics, and maintenance has been true of both regime types, whether the Soviets earlier in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya or the United States currently in various monarchies and republics from Morocco to the Gulf. But there is a difference of degree in this area as well, for while the republics, including Egypt, rely on foreign military patrons, they tend to restrict their politically relevant access more than do the monarchies. U.S. military personnel in the GCC states and Jordan, for example, can interact with their local counterparts and visit military installations more or less at will, whereas in Egypt they may not do so without prior notification and clearance from the high command, which is rarely forthcoming, even after Mubarak’s removal. The monarchical militaries also tend to have much greater interoperability with U.S. forces than do the republics. The more open embrace of foreign and especially U.S. military patrons in the monarchies reflects their profound dependence for regime survival on those forces, as well as the republics’ comparatively greater autonomy and true sovereignty.

Another difference between the monarchical and republican militaries is the latter’s greater propensity to be engaged directly in the productive economy, as either a corporate institution or in the form of individual officers (see chapter 7). Egypt’s military economy is the largest in the Arab world, but smaller equivalents have also existed in Syria, Sudan, and Iraq. Algerian officers acting individually or in cabals lurk behind their country’s hydrocarbon economy. Among the monarchies it is only in Jordan
where an institutionalized military economy is emerging along with the networks of economic penetration and influence of the officer corps. The relative absence of militaries from monarchial economies, except in comparatively poor Jordan, reflects both the greater wealth of the monarchies—hence their ability to reward militaries directly rather than through side payments in the broader economy—and their comparatively weaker military institutionalization.

This differentiation of monarchies and republics into subtypes thus reveals some systematic variation in militaries and their control, suggesting that sultanism is shaped by context, whose key element is institutionalization, especially of the military. Praetorian “bunker” republics, “ruled physically or metaphorically from bunkers” because their states “have little if any autonomy from the traditional social forces” that seized control of them at the end of colonial rule, include Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan. Authority in these states is highly sultanistic in that loyalties are based primarily on family, clan, tribe, and/or sect, rather than on broad horizontal alliances or institutional affiliations. Personalistic control by rulers operates through these primordial loyalties, so shadow states lurk behind institutions, which exercise only nominal authority.

The means of coercion, being the most vital components of these states, are particularly enmeshed in networks of primordial loyalties extending down from president sultans. Typically, their close relatives, preferably sons who are being groomed to inherit power, command key military units, while much of the officer corps is recruited from the dominant vital social force. The professionalization and institutionalization of militaries and intelligence services are limited, so even though those armed forces do not pose threats to the sultan, neither can they as a whole be trusted to implement his orders without attrition due to desertion by those officers and men not members of the dominant social force. But as the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni cases attest, the “shadow state” core of those militaries can be expected to remain loyal even when the peripheral components collapse. Because these president sultans anticipate that their narrowly based rule may be challenged by force, they rely more heavily on militaries than on intelligence services, thereby elevating the role and capacities of the former over the latter. So, for example, in Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the three bunker republics that, beginning in 2011, confronted the uprisings, military units commanded by sons or, in the case of Syria, both brother Maher al-Assad and brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, played the most important role in attempting to subdue the opposition. Security and intelligence forces have
been virtually absent from those battlefields. In all three cases, desertions have been commonplace by officers and soldiers who are not members of the state’s key social force or enmeshed in the president’s personal network of control. In Yemen, the highly factionalized tribal system underpinning the military was too fragile to sustain the challenge to Ali Abdullah Saleh, so parts of it broke off, taking their components of the military into opposition with them. These, then, are states that purposely obstruct the growth of institutions in order to preserve the ascriptive norms, personalism, and deep states on which political power rests and through which their sultan presidents rule.

Tunisia and Egypt are “bully” praetorian states in which presidents have based their rule “on the institutional power of the military/security/party apparatus” because these leaders are not drawn from a clearly identified social formation and are not, therefore, “unrepresentative of their relatively homogeneous political communities.” Thus the armed forces in Tunisia and Egypt are more institutionalized and have stronger professional commitments and loyalties than do those in the bunker republics. Security and intelligence services have also played relatively greater political roles in Tunisia and Egypt, precisely because their presidents did not anticipate the violent reaction to their rule based on widespread countermobilization within tribally, ethnically, or religiously based social solidarities. These regimes foresaw the potential opposition in these states to be conducted by individuals and groups that did not have preexisting constituencies based in quasi-autonomous social formations that they could mobilize. The means of control exercised by security services were deemed to be adequate to such challenges not underpinned by “organic” social solidarities.

The monarchies are more similar in nature than the republics, so their armed forces also are more alike. But the monarchies can be thought of as being subdivided into two main groups, along with one outlier. Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait are more liberal, tolerating greater degrees of political expression and competition and possessing more sophisticated political infrastructures than the remaining GCC monarchies, although Oman is a somewhat special case, not being ruled by an extended family, as is the case with the others. The relative institutionalization of the respective militaries varies according to these categories, with those in Morocco and Jordan and, to a substantially lesser extent, Kuwait, being more institutionalized than those in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The Omani military is closer to those of Jordan and Morocco than to those in neighboring GCC countries, in that the ruling family does not control
key command positions in the officer corps. Unlike the liberal monarchies, however, Oman has a long and continuing tradition of foreign involvement. The militaries in the four most authoritarian GCC states are, as the sultanistic model would suggest, the most directly subordinate to family rule and have the least developed separate, corporate identity. The officer corps in Morocco and Jordan is both relatively professional and unrelated to the ruling family, whereas in Kuwait the ruling Sabah family controls the military largely through the Ministry of Defense rather than through the officer corps itself and by ensuring that the army remains small.

The Moroccan, and especially the Jordanian, military plays a key role in projecting the identities of their states, such as by participating in peace support activities worldwide, as does the Omani military, though to a lesser extent. Militaries in the more authoritarian monarchies are not used to project national images, a privilege that is reserved for the ruling families. In the event of major challenges to the monarchies, the militaries in Morocco and Jordan would likely seek to save their states if they were in danger of going down along with their monarchs, whereas those in the more authoritarian GCC monarchies might replicate the behavior of militaries in the bunker republics, with the officer relatives of the ruling sultans choosing regime over state, or at least some royals in the regime, thus inviting fragmentation or at least debilitation of the military institution. Kuwait is probably closer to its GCC neighbors in this regard, and the Omani military might be more like those in Morocco and Jordan, choosing to save the state, in part because there is not a sprawling, extended monarchial family to defend.

In sum then, sultanism’s impact on the military is attenuated considerably in the bully republics and at least two of the liberal monarchies, in which institutionalization of the military and professionalism of the officer corps is relatively greater than in the bunker republics or the more authoritarian monarchies.

Prospects for Civilian Control of Arab Militaries

Tight and highly personalized control of militaries by executives, whether presidential or monarchial, is ubiquitous in the Arab world. Control based on law and exercised by civilian institutions of the state and civil society is nowhere to be found. A, if not the, challenge facing the movements that brought about the Arab spring is to establish such control. The relevance of the literature on civil-military relations that focuses primarily on control, especially during democratic transitions, seems limited. Much of it was
based on the experience of Latin America, where the militaries were comparatively highly corporatized and polities had previous experiences with at least quasi constitutionalism and rule of law, if not established democracy. In most cases, civil societies were considerably more robust than they have been in the Arab world. Sultanism is conspicuous by its near total absence in Latin America, as it is in Eastern Europe, the region that, after Latin America, has contributed most to the literature.

Finally, regional and global effects have been much more favorable for civilian control of militaries and broader democratization in areas other than the Arab world. It is the least democratized region and therefore, by definition, the one with the least civilian control of its militaries. The regional effect, to the extent that there is one, has been to support authoritarianism and the subordination of civilian politics to the armed forces. Regional effects in Europe and Latin America, in contrast, were conducive to the democratic control of armed forces. Various countries on both continents were established democracies or passed through democratic transitions, accompanied by the establishment or reestablishment of civilian control of militaries. There were, in short, positive models to emulate, to say nothing of supportive regional norms and institutions, not the least of which was the European Union in the case of Europe. In Latin America an energized nongovernmental organization, RESDAL, supported by the Open Society Foundations and the U.S. Department of Defense's Center for Civil-Military Relations, has played a vital role in raising political consciousness and providing the necessary information for effective civilian control of the armed forces. As for global effects, the Middle East is the world's most highly securitized region, as indicated by the amount and intensity of inter- and intrastate conflict, the existence of terrorism and counterterrorism, the spending on arms, the presence of external forces, and the size and roles of armed forces. The most powerful external actors since World War II, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States, all emphasized the security dimension in their relations with the region, as reflected by their greater concern with armed forces than with civilian political institutions. The United States, the only such external actor remaining, persists with this approach.

Those who brought about the Arab uprisings cannot, therefore, readily find road maps for the democratic control of armed forces in the existing literature, nor is their task of establishing such control going to be easy. Regional and global forces are not favorable. Sultanism remains pervasive. Where institutionalization of the armed forces has occurred and sultanism
constrained, if not transformed, the military institution itself may defend its prerogatives and independence from civilian control, as it seems intent on doing in Egypt and would probably do so in Jordan, Morocco, and Oman if it came to power in any of those countries. Tunisia looks to be the one possible short-term exception, but evidence of the military’s behind-the-scenes influence on the emerging political order, combined with the popularity of the institution and tensions between Islamists and secularists, suggests that any bet on a successful transition in Tunisia should at least be hedged. Increasing speculation about the relevance of the Turkish model to civil-military relations, including speculation about the Egyptian military, which is seeking to preserve a guardian role for itself, is not encouraging. It is presented as an alternative to immediate, substantial civilian oversight and control and is projected into the indefinite future, not as a short-term, transitional stage.29

Be that as it may, those Arab militaries less penetrated by sultanistic networks may at least entertain ways and means of further enhancing institutionalization and professionalization, which are in turn associated with civilian control, if not necessarily guarantees of it. Ultimately, however, effective control of the armed forces requires civilian authorities to fight for its establishment, no matter how professional the officer corps may be. Whether or not the Arab streets that rose up in 2011 against ruling regimes are ultimately able to accomplish this remains to be seen. The apparent preference of Islamist movements to instrumentalize armed forces to serve their own political interests, as opposed to seeking to subordinate them to institutionalized civilian control, does not bode well. Indeed, Islamists seem to be offering a reprieve to the nondemocratic armed forces just recently threatened by popular uprisings. So the most positive observation possible at this stage is that at least in some countries, including Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, secular civilian activists are contemplating how to oversee and, indeed, control their militaries. They too, however, are tempted to instrumentalize the armed forces as a tactic in their struggle against Islamists. The Arab world may, therefore, ultimately contribute an interesting, new chapter to the literature on civil military relations.

NOTES

Arab League members say the new Arab military force will help with the many security issues there are in the Middle East. The Arab League tweeted that there will be meetings over the next month to study how to create the force. The findings of the meetings will be presented to the defence ministers of Arab nations within four months. The defence ministers will then decide which countries will provide the soldiers and equipment. Not all Arab League countries supported the idea of a joint Arab military force. Arabic Scarf Cotton Military Shemagh Keffiyeh 34"x34" Tactical Arab Scarf Shawl Neck Cover Head Wrap For Men Women Hiking Scarf. US $10.99 / piece. (15) | 296 Orders. PE Sporting &Outdoor Store. 100x100cm Outdoor Hiking Scarves Military Arab Tactical Desert Scarf Army Shemagh with Tassel for Men Women Bandana Scarf Mask. US $2.69 / piece. (39) | 287 Orders.